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Abstract
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms are often used to allocate tasks to selfish and rational
agents. VCG mechanisms are incentive compatible, direct mechanisms that are efficient (i.e., max-
imise social utility) and individually rational (i.e., agents prefer to join rather than opt out). How-
ever, an important assumption of these mechanisms is that the agents will always successfully com-
plete their allocated tasks. Clearly, this assumption is unrealistic in many real-world applications,
where agents can, and often do, fail in their endeavours. Moreover, whether an agent is deemed to
have failed may be perceived differently by different agents. Such subjective perceptions about an
agent’s probability of succeeding at a given task are often captured and reasoned about using the
notion of trust. Given this background, in this paper we investigate the design of novel mechanisms
that take into account the trust between agents when allocating tasks.
Specifically, we develop a new class of mechanisms, called trust-based mechanisms, that can
take into account multiple subjective measures of the probability of an agent succeeding at a given
task and produce allocations that maximise social utility, whilst ensuring that no agent obtains
a negative utility. We then show that such mechanisms pose a challenging new combinatorial
optimisation problem (that is NP-complete), devise a novel representation for solving the problem,
and develop an effective integer programming solution (that can solve instances with about 2×105
possible allocations in 40 seconds).
c©2009 AI Access Foundation. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Task allocation is an important and challenging problem within the field of multi-agent systems.
The problem involves deciding how to assign a number of tasks to a set of agents according to some
allocation protocol. For example, a number of computational jobs may need to be allocated to agents
that run high performance computing data centres (Byde, 2006), a number of network maintenance
tasks may need to be performed by communications companies for a number of business clients
(Jennings, Faratin, Norman, O’Brien, Odgers, & Alty, 2000), or a number of transportation tasks
may need to be allocated to a number of delivery companies (Sandholm, 1993). In the general case,
the agents performing these jobs or asking for these jobs to be performed will be trying to maximise
their own gains (e.g., companies owning data centres or servers will be trying to minimise the
number of servers utilised, communications companies will try to minimise the number of people
needed to complete the tasks demanded, and transportation companies will try to use the minimum
number of vehicles). Given this, Mechanism Design (MD) techniques can be employed to design
these task allocation protocols since these techniques can produce solutions that have provable and
desirable properties when faced with autonomous and utility maximising actors (Dash, Parkes, &
Jennings, 2003). In particular, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) class of mechanisms has been
advocated in a number of problem domains (Walsh & Wellman, 1998; Hershberger & Suri, 2001;
Dash et al., 2003) because they maximise social welfare (i.e., they are efficient) and guarantee a non-
negative utility to the participating agents (i.e., they are individually rational). In such mechanisms,
agents typically reveal their costs for performing the tasks or their valuation of the requested tasks to
a centre and the centre then computes the allocation of tasks to each agent and the payments they all
need to make and receive. However, an important underpinning assumption that such mechanisms
make is that an agent always successfully completes every task that is assigned to it by the centre.
The result of this assumption is that an allocation (i.e., an assignment of tasks that are asked for
by requester agents and executed by task performer agents) is selected by the centre based only
on the costs or valuations provided by the agents. This ensures that the centre always chooses the
performers that are the cheapest and the requesters that are ready to pay the most. However, the
agents chosen by the centre may ultimately not be successful in completing their assignment. For
example, an agent providing access to a data centre with a cost of £10, but with a success rate of
100%, might be preferable to one providing the same service with a cheaper cost of £5 but with a
10% chance of being successful. Thus, in order to make efficient allocations in such circumstances,
we need to design mechanisms that consider both the task performers’ costs for the service and their
probability of success (POS). Now, this probability may be perceived differently by different agents
because they typically have different standards or means of evaluating the performance of their
counterparts. For example, different customers might evaluate the performance of a data centre in
different ways such as timeliness, security, or quality of the output. Given this, we turn to the notion
of trust to capture such subjective perceptions (Ramchurn, Huynh, & Jennings, 2004). To take into
account the agents’ trust in other agents, as well as their costs, when allocating tasks requires the
design of a new class of mechanisms that we have previously termed trust-based (Dash, Ramchurn,
& Jennings, 2004).
To date, however, existing work on trust-based mechanisms (TBMs) ignores a number of impor-
tant aspects of the task allocation problem which makes them less robust to uncertainty (see Section
2 for more details). First, Porter, Ronen, Shoham, and Tennenholtz (2008) only allow POS reports
to come from the task performer, rather than any other agent. This means the task requester can
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be misled by the task performer’s opinion (even if it is truthfully revealed) since the task requester
may believe, at times, that the task performer failed while the task performer believes it has suc-
ceeded. Second, in our previous work (Dash et al., 2004), we presented a trust-based mechanism
that could result in inefficient allocations as agents had strong incentives to over-report their POS.
Even more importantly, however, existing trust-based mechanisms completely ignore the computa-
tional cost associated with including the POS and computing the optimal allocation and payments.
Thus, while previous work highlights the economic benefits, they do not specify how the new prob-
lem can be effectively represented and efficiently solved. By ignoring these issues, previous work
has failed to prove that such mechanisms can actually be implemented, solved, and whether they
scale up to reasonable numbers of agents.
Against this background, this paper provides economically efficient and individually rational
mechanisms for scenarios in which there exists uncertainty about agents successfully completing
their assigned tasks. This execution uncertainty can generally be modelled as follows. First, poten-
tial task performers are assessed by a task requester that uses both its individual experience of their
performance and information gathered from its environment (such as reports by other agents about
their performance) to construct its estimation of their POS. Often these sources are called confi-
dence and reputation respectively (Ramchurn et al., 2004; Dasgupta, 1998), and when combined
they give the notion of trust in an agent performing a particular task. This combined view of trust
is used here because it is a more robust measure of POS than any single estimate (especially one
originating from the task performer). This is evident from the fact that each agent is only likely to
have a partial view of the performance of a task performer because it is derived from a finite subset
of its interactions. For example, a task requester having ten tasks performed by an agent may benefit
from the experience acquired from another requester’s fifty interactions with that same agent. How-
ever, incorporating trust in the decision mechanism of the requester introduces two major issues.
First, when agents use reports from other agents to build trust, it introduces the possibility of inter-
dependent valuations. This means that the value that is generated by one agent in the system can be
affected by another agent’s report to the mechanism (Jehiel & Moldovanu, 2001; Mezzetti, 2004).
This, in turn, makes it much harder than in standard VCG-based techniques to incentivise agents to
reveal their private information truthfully. Second, using trust to find the optimal allocation involves
a significant computational cost and we show that solving the optimisation problem of trust-based
mechanisms is NP-complete.
To tackle the issue of interdependence, we build upon the work by Mezzetti (2004, 2007) to
construct a novel mechanism that incentivises agents to reveal their private information. More-
over, to help combat the computational complexity generated by trust, we go on to develop a novel
representation for the optimisation problem posed by trust-based mechanisms and provide an im-
plementation based on Integer Programming (IP). Given this, we show that the main bottleneck of
the mechanism lies in searching through a large set of possible allocations, but demonstrate that our
IP solution can comfortably solve small and medium instances within minutes (e.g., for 6 tasks and
50 agents) or hours (e.g., for 8 tasks and 70 agents).1 In so doing, we provide the first benchmark
for algorithms that aim to solve such optimisation problems.
In more detail, this paper advances the state of the art in the following ways:
1. Though the time taken to find the optimal solution grows exponentially with the number of tasks, our mechanism sets
the baseline performance in solving the optimisation problem posed by trust-based mechanisms.
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1. We design novel TBMs that can allocate tasks when there is uncertainty about their comple-
tion. Our TBMs are non-trivial extensions to the paper by Porter et al. (2008) because they
are the first to consider the reputation of a task performer within the system, in addition to its
self-report. This allows us to build greater robustness into the mechanism since it takes into
account the subjective perceptions of all agents (task requesters in particular) about the POS
of task performers.
2. We prove that our TBMs are incentive compatible, efficient and individually rational.
3. We develop a novel representation for the optimisation problem posed by TBMs and, given
this, cast the problem as a special matching problem (Berge, 1973). We show that solving
the generalised version of TBMs is NP-complete and provide the first Integer Programming
solution for it. This solution can solve instances of 50 agents and 6 tasks within one minute
and even larger instances within hours.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We start by providing an overview of the related
work in Section 2. We then provide the contributions listed above in a step-wise manner. First,
a simple task allocation model is detailed in Section 3, where we introduce the TBM for a single
requester, single task scenario. Section 4 then develops the generalised TBM for multiple requesters
and multiple tasks and we prove its economic properties. Having dealt with the economic aspects,
we then turn to the computational problem of implementing TBMs in Section 5. Specifically, we
develop a new representation for the optimisation problem posed by the generalised TBM, study
the computational costs associated with solving the problem, and provide an IP-based solution to it.
Section 6 then discusses a number of broader issues related to the development of future trust-based
mechanisms.
2. Related Work
In associating uncertainty to mechanism design, we build upon work in both areas. With regards to
capturing uncertainty in multi-agent interactions, most work has focused on devising computational
models of trust and reputation (see papers by Teacy, Patel, Jennings, & Luck, 2006, and Ramchurn
et al., 2004, for reviews). These models mostly use statistical methods to estimate the reliability of
an opponent from other agents’ reports and direct interactions with the opponent. Some of these
models also try to identify false or inaccurate reports by checking how closely each report matches
an agent’s direct experience with the opponent (Teacy et al., 2006; Jurca & Faltings, 2006). Now,
while these models can help in choosing the most successful agents, they are not shown to generate
efficient outcomes in any given mechanism. In contrast, in this paper we provide the means to use
such models in order to do just this.
In the case of MD, there has been surprisingly little work on achieving efficient, incentive com-
patible and individually rational mechanisms that take into account uncertainty in general. The
approaches adopted can be separated into work on reputation mechanisms and mechanisms for
task or resource allocation. The former mainly aim at eliciting honest feedback from reputation
providers. Examples of such mechanisms include papers by Dellarocas (2002), Miller, Resnick,
and Zeckhauser (2005), and Jurca and Faltings (2003, 2006). In particular, Miller et al. (2005) re-
cently developed the peer prediction model, which incentivises agents to report truthfully about their
experience. Their mechanism operates by rewarding reporters according to how well their reports
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coincide with the experience of their peers. Specifically, it assigns scores to the distance between
a given agent’s report and other selected reference reporters’ reports on a given task performer. In
a similar way, Jurca and Faltings (2007) have also attempted to solve the same problem by placing
more importance on the repeated presence of agents in the system in order to induce truthful report-
ing. However, given that they focus on eliciting honest feedback, their mechanism is silent as to
what this feedback is actually used for. In particular, it cannot be employed in the task allocation
scenario we study in this paper because in our case the objective is to maximise the overall utility
of the society that, therefore, considers the value and POS of agents. For example, a car repair has
a lower value than building a bridge. Hence, the feedback on the car repairer is less critical than the
feeback on the bridge builder in terms of its impact on the social welfare. Interestingly, their mech-
anism is shown to have truth-telling as a (non-unique) Nash equilibrium and it is budget balanced,
but not individually rational (see Section 6 on how these social desiderata interplay).
In terms of MD for task allocation, type uncertainty is taken into account by Bayesian mech-
anisms such as dAGVA (d’Aspremont & Gerard-Varet, 1979; Arrow, 1979). This considers the
case when the payoffs to the agents are determined via a probability distribution of types which is
common knowledge to all agents. However, this mechanism cannot deal with our problem in which
there is uncertainty about task completion, and each agent has information about the POS of all
other agents, but there is no common knowledge of the type distributions. Porter et al. (2008) have
also considered this task allocation problem and their mechanism is the one that is most closely
related to ours. However, they limit themselves to the case where agents can only report on their
own POS. This is a serious drawback because it assumes the agents can measure their own POS
accurately and it does not consider the case where the agents may have different perceptions on the
POS (e.g., a performer believes that it performs better or worse than what the requester perceives).
Moreover, they only consider a single requester setting, while the mechanisms we develop here
deal with multiple tasks and multiple requesters. Thus, our mechanisms can be considered to be
a two-way generalisation of theirs. First, we allow multiple reports of uncertainty that need to be
fused appropriately to give a precise POS as perceived by the requester. Second, we generalise their
mechanism to the case of multiple requesters where the agents can provide combinatorial valuations
on multiple tasks. In our earlier work on this problem (Dash et al., 2004), we proposed a prelim-
inary TBM where the agents could have followed the risky, but potentially profitable strategy, of
over-reporting their costs or under-reporting their valuations since payments are not made accord-
ing to whether they succeed or fail in the allocated task (which we do in our new mechanism). In
contrast, in this work, the payment scheme ensures that such a strategy is not viable and thus this
mechanism is more robust. Moreover, our previous work assumed trust functions that were mono-
tonically increasing in POS reports and (similar to Porter et al.) did not develop the algorithms that
are needed to actually solve the optimisation problem posed by a TBM. In this paper, we present a
mechanism that applies to more general trust functions and also develop algorithms to solve TBMs.
Finally, our work is a case of interdependent, multidimensional allocation schemes. With inter-
dependent payoffs, Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) have shown that is impossible to achieve efficiency
with a one-stage mechanism. Mezzetti (2004), however, has shown that it is possible to achieve ef-
ficiency with an elegant two-stage mechanism under very reasonable assumptions. Our mechanism
achieves efficiency without needing two reporting stages because, in the setting we consider, pay-
ments can be contingent on whether or not tasks are successful and because agents do not derive a
direct payoff from the allocation of a task to another agent or the other agents’ assessments about
the completion probabilities. In our setting, there exists a specific function that captures the interde-
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pendence that exists among the agents through their assessments of each others’ POS. This function
is, in our case, the agents’ trust model.
3. Single Requester, Single Task Allocation Mechanisms
In this section, we first present the basic VCG mechanism for a simple task allocation model (a
single task being requested by a single agent) where the allocated task is guaranteed to be completed
(i.e., all agents’ POS are equal to 1). We then briefly describe Porter et al.’s (2008) extension
which considers task performers that have a privately known objective probability that they finish
the assigned task. Finally, we consider the case where the POS of a task performer is a function
of privately known variables held by each task performer in the system. This ensures that the
choice made by the task requester is better informed (drawing data from various sources) about
the POS of task performers. We show how Porter et al.’s mechanism would fail to produce the
efficient allocation in such settings and then go on to provide a non-trivial extension of their model
to cater for this. In so doing, we define a new trust-based mechanism for the single requester,
single task scenario (as a prelude to the generalised mechanism that we will develop in the next
section). We then go on to prove the economic properties of this simple TBM. Throughout this
section, a running example task allocation problem is employed to demonstrate the workings of the
mechanisms discussed.
3.1 Allocation with Guaranteed Task Completion
In this task allocation scenario, a single agent derives a value when a certain task is performed. To
this end, that agent needs to allocate the task to one of the available task performers, which will
charge a certain amount to execute the task. We start by considering the following simple example:
Example 1. MoviePictures.com, a computer graphics company, has an image rendering task that
it wishes to complete for a new movie. Hence, MoviePictures.com publicly announces its intention
to all companies owning data centres that can execute the task. Given the interest shown by many
of these companies, MoviePictures.com needs to decide on the mechanism to allocate the contract
and how much to pay the chosen contractor, given that MoviePictures.com does not know all the
contractors’ costs to execute the job (i.e., it does not know how much it actually costs each company
to process the images and render them to the required quality).
The above example can be captured by the following model. There is a set of agents (data
centre agents in the example), I = {1, 2, . . . , i, . . . , I}, who each have a privately-known cost
ci(τ) ∈ R
+ ∪ {0} of performing the rendering task τ . Furthermore, let MoviePictures.com be
represented by a special agent 0, who has a value v0(τ) ∈ R+ ∪ {0} for the rendering task and a
cost of c0(τ) > v0(τ) to perform the task (c0(τ) = ∞ in case agent 0 cannot execute the task).
Hence, MoviePictures.com can only get the task performed by another agent in the set I who has a
cost ci(τ) ≤ v0(τ).
Now, MoviePictures.com needs to decide on the procedure to award the contract, and hence,
acts as the centre that will invite offers from the other agents to perform the task. In devising such
a mechanism for task allocation, we focus on incentive-compatible direct revelation mechanisms
(DRMs) by invoking the revelation principle which states that any mechanism can be transformed
into a DRM (Krishna, 2002). In this context, “direct revelation” means the strategy space (i.e., all
possible actions) of the agents is restricted to reporting their type (i.e., their private information, for
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example their cost or valuation of a task) and “incentive-compatible” means the equilibrium strategy
(i.e., best strategy under a certain equilibrium concept) is truth-telling.
Thus, in a DRM, the designer has control over two parts: 1) the allocation rule that deter-
mines who wins the contract, and 2) the payment rule that determines the transfer of money be-
tween the centre (i.e., MoviePictures.com) and the agents (i.e., the data centres). Let K denote
a particular allocation within the space of possible allocations K and τ i←0 represent that agent
i gets allocated task τ from agent 0. Then, in this setting, the space of all possible allocations
are K = {∅, τ1←0, τ2←0, . . . , τ I←0} where ∅ denotes the case where the task is not allocated.
Moreover, we abuse notation slightly to define the cost of an allocation K to agent i, as being
ci(K) = ci(τ) if K = τ i←0 and ci(K) = 0 otherwise. Similarly, for the centre, the value of a
non empty allocation is simply the value it has for the task, i.e., v0(K) = v0(τ) if K 6= ∅ and
v0(K) = 0 if K = ∅. Finally, let ri(·) ∈ R be the payment by the centre to agent i. In case ri(·) is
negative, agent i has to pay |ri(·)| to the centre.
Within the context of task allocation, direct mechanisms take the form of sealed-bid auctions
where task performers report their costs to a centre (or auctioneer). Agents may not wish to report
their true costs if reporting these falsely leads to a preferable outcome for them. We will therefore
distinguish between the actual costs and the reported ones by superscripting the latter with ‘̂’.
The task allocation problem then consists of choosing the allocation and payment rules such that
certain desirable system objectives (some of which are detailed below) are satisfied. An allocation
rule is a mapping from reported costs to the set of allocations, with K(ĉi, ĉ−i) being the allocation
chosen when agent i reports ĉi and all other agents report the vector ĉ−i. Similarly, a payment rule
is a mapping from reported costs to payments for each agent, with ri(ĉi, ĉ−i) being the payment to
agent i when agent i reports ĉi and all other agents report the vector ĉ−i.
Following the task execution and payments, an agent i derives a utility given by its utility func-
tion ui : K × R → R. As is common in this domain, we assume that an agent is rational (expected
utility maximiser) and has a quasi-linear utility function (MasColell, Whinston, & Green, 1995):
Definition 1. A quasi-linear utility function is one that can be expressed as:
ui(K, ri) = ri − ci(K) (1)
where K ∈ K is a given allocation.
Having modelled the problem as above, MoviePictures.com would like to use a protocol that
possesses the desirable properties of efficiency and individual rationality. It also needs to make sure
that the protocol is incentive compatible: agents must find it optimal to report their true costs. These
desiderata can be formally defined as follows:
Definition 2. Efficiency: the allocation mechanism is said to achieve efficiency if the outcome it
generates maximises the total utility of all the agents in the system (without considering transfers).
That is, for all vectors of reports ĉ, it calculates K∗ such that:
K∗(ĉ) = arg max
K∈K
[
v0(K)−
∑
i∈I
ĉi(K)
]
(2)
Definition 3. Individual Rationality: the allocation mechanism is said to achieve individual ratio-
nality if agents derive higher utility when participating in the mechanism than when opting out of it.
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Assuming that the utility that an agent obtains when opting out is zero, then an individually rational
allocation K is one in which (Krishna, 2002):
ui(K, ri) ≥ 0 , ∀i ∈ I (3)
Definition 4. Incentive compatibility: the allocation mechanism is said to achieve incentive com-
patibility if an agent’s true type is its optimal report no matter what other agents report. That
is:
ri(ci, ĉ−i)− ci(K(ci, ĉ−i)) ≥ ri(ĉi, ĉ−i)− ci(K(ĉi, ĉ−i)) ∀ci,∀ĉi,∀ĉ−i.
Note that incentive compatibility implies that for each vector of reports of the other agents ĉ−i
the payments to agent i must depend on i’s own report only through the chosen allocation. Incentive
compatibility requires that telling the truth be a (weakly) dominant strategy. It is also important to
note that incentive compatibility in dominant strategies is the strongest possible form of incentive
compatibility. The VCG mechanism has this property.
MoviePictures.com then decides to employ a Vickrey auction (also known as a second-price
sealed bid auction) since this protocol possesses the desired properties of incentive compatibility,
efficiency, and individual rationality (Krishna, 2002). In more detail, after having received the
sealed bids (reports ĉ) from all the agents, the centre calculates the allocation K∗(ĉ) according to
Equation (2), while the transfer ri(·) to the winner i is given by:
ri(ĉ) = v0(K
∗(ĉ))− max
K′∈K−i
v0(K ′)− ∑
j∈I\i
ĉj(K
′)
 (4)
where K−i is the set of all allocations that do not involve i as a task performer.
3.2 Allocation with Execution Uncertainty
In the mechanism presented in the previous section, it is assumed that once the allocation K∗ is
decided, its value v0(K∗) will be obtained by the centre (either v0(τ) if the task has been allocated
or 0 otherwise). Thus, there is an implicit assumption that once allocated a task, an agent will
always perform it successfully. However, this is unrealistic, as illustrated by the following example:
Example 2. Many of the previous rendering tasks required by MoviePictures.com were allocated
to PoorRender Ltd because of its very competitive prices. Unfortunately, PoorRender Ltd could
not complete the task in many cases because of lack of staff and other technical problems (which
it knew about before even bidding for the task). As a result, MoviePictures.com incurred severe
losses. Hence, MoviePictures.com decides to alter the allocation mechanism in such a way that
the agents’ POS in completing the tasks can be factored into the selection of the cheapest agent.
MoviePictures.com assumes each contractor knows its own POS and cost privately and needs the
mechanism to elicit this information truthfully in order to choose the best allocation.
The above problem was studied by Porter et al. (2008) and we briefly describe, in our own terms,
their mechanism in order to extend and generalise it later (see Sections 3.3 and 4). We first introduce
the boolean indicator variable κ that will denote whether the task has been completed (κ = 1) or
not (κ = 0). Thus, κ is only observable after the task has been allocated. Moreover, we extend
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our notation here to capture the centre’s valuation of the task execution such that v0(κ) = v0(K∗)
if κ = 1 and v0(κ) = 0 if κ = 0. In this setting, we assume that κ is commonly observed (i.e.,
if agent i believes that κ = 1, then all agents i ∈ I ∪ {0} believe the same). In our rendering
example, κ might denote whether the images are rendered up to the appropriate resolution which
will allow its usage or not. Furthermore, the probability that κ = 1 once the task is allocated to
agent i is dependent upon another privately known variable, pi(τ) ∈ [0, 1], which is the POS of
agent i in executing task τ . Note that this variable is privately known to the task performer i itself,
and so there is a single observation within the system, carried out by the task performer, about its
own POS. Also note that the task performer incurs the cost ci(τ) as soon as it attempts the task τ
and irrespective of whether it is successful or not.
As can be seen, the value that the centre (MoviePictures.com) will derive, v0(κ), is not known
before the allocation is calculated. Hence, the notions of efficiency and individual rationality intro-
duced in section 3.1 need to be adjusted to this new setting. Given the probability that the task will
be executed by a given agent, we have to consider the expected value of an allocation, v0(K,p),
which is calculated as:
v0(K,p) = v0(K) · pi(τ) (5)
where i is the agent chosen to perform the task in allocation K and p = 〈p1(τ), . . . , pI(τ)〉 is
the vector of POS values of all the agents (the list of assessments by each contractor of its own
probability that it will complete the rendering task as in our example). We now need to require
agents to report their POS, in addition to the cost. We denote as p̂ the vector of reported POS values
〈p̂1(τ), . . . , p̂I(τ)〉.
The following modified desiderata need to be considered now:
Definition 5. Efficiency: a mechanism is said to achieve efficiency if it chooses the allocation that
maximises the sum of expected utilities (without considering the transfers):
K∗(ĉ, p̂) = arg max
K∈K
[
v0(K, p̂)−
∑
i∈I
ĉi(K)
]
(6)
Note here that both ĉi(K) and p̂ are reported by the agents and are key to computing the efficient
allocation.
Definition 6. Individual Rationality: a mechanism achieves individual rationality if a participating
agent i derives an expected utility, ui, which is always non-negative:
ui(c,p) = ri(c,p)− ci(K) ≥ 0
where ri(c,p) is the expected payment that agent i receives.
In order to achieve these desiderata, one could suppose that a naı¨ve extension of the standard
Vickrey mechanism presented above would be sufficient. In such a mechanism, the centre would
ask the agents to report their extended types (ĉi, p̂i(τ)). The allocation chosen would then be the one
maximising the expected utility of the agents and the payment rule would be conditioned according
to Equation (4) with v0(K∗,p) replacing v0(K∗). However, such a mechanism would fail in these
settings, as illustrated in the next section.
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3.2.1 NAI¨VE APPLICATION OF THE VICKREY AUCTION
Example 3. Consider the case where MoviePictures.com derives a value of v0(τ) = 300 when
the rendering task is completed and let there be three contractors whose costs ci(τ) to render the
images are given by (c1(τ), c2(τ), c3(τ)) = (100, 150, 200). Furthermore, assume each contractor
has a POS given by (p1(τ), p2(τ), p3(τ)) = (0.5, 0.9, 1). This information is represented in Table
1.
The efficient allocation in this case (shaded line in Table 1) involves assigning the task to agent
2 with an expected social utility of 300 × 0.9 − 150 = 120. The payment to agent 2 using the
(reverse) Vickrey auction with expected values is 300 × 0.9 − (300 − 200) = 170 (from Equation
(4)). However, such a mechanism is not incentive-compatible. For example, if agent 1 reveals that
p̂1(τ) = 1, then the centre will implement K∗ = τ1←0 and will pay agent 1, r1 = 300−120 = 180.
Thus, the agents in such a mechanism are always better off reporting p̂i(τ) = 1, no matter what
their actual POS is! Hence, the centre will not be able to implement the efficient allocation.
Agent ci(τ) pi(τ)
1 100 0.5
2 150 0.9
3 200 1
Table 1: Costs of performing task τ and each agent’s own perceived probability of successfully completing
the task.
This type extension (i.e., including the POS) is non-trivial because the POS report of an agent
affects the social value expected by the centre, but not the agent’s cost under an allocation. As
a result, reporting a higher POS will only positively affect an agent’s probability of winning the
allocation and thus will positively affect its utility. To rectify this, we need a means by which this
gain in utility is balanced by a penalty so that only on truthfully reporting its type, will an agent
maximise its utility. This is achieved in Porter et al.’s (2008) mechanism, which we briefly detail in
the next section.
3.2.2 PORTER ET AL.’S MECHANISM
This mechanism is based around payments being applied after the completion of tasks. Specifically,
the mechanism finds the marginal contribution that an agent has made to the expected welfare of
other agents depending on whether it completes its assigned task or not. Intuitively, this works since
the payment scheme punishes an agent that is assigned a task but does not complete it (i.e., κ = 0).
As a result, the agent is not incentivised to reveal a higher POS value than its real POS since if it is
then allocated the task, it is more likely to reap a punishment rather than the reward which it obtains
when it successfully completes the task (i.e., κ = 1).
In more detail, the allocation is determined by the centre according to Equation (6). The pay-
ment rule for an agent i to which the task τ is allocated is similar to that of the VCG in that the
marginal contribution of the agent to the system is extracted by comparing the efficient allocation
with the second best allocation, excluding the agent (the agent gets ri(ĉ, p̂, κ) = 0 if it is not allo-
cated the task). The difference is that it is the expected marginal contribution that is extracted (i.e.,
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taking into account the agent’s real probability of success). This is achieved as follows:
ri(ĉ, p̂, κ) =

v0(K
∗(ĉ, p̂))− max
K′∈K−i
(
v0(K
′, p̂)−
∑
j∈I\i ĉj(K
′)
)
, if κ = 1
− max
K′∈K−i
(
v0(K
′, p̂)−
∑
j∈I\i ĉj(K
′)
)
, if κ = 0
(7)
where K−i is the set of allocations excluding agent i.
The mechanism would work with the example provided in Table 1 since if, for example, agent
1 reports p̂1(τ) = 1, it will then be allocated the task and will be paid 300 − 120 = 180 with a
probability of 0.5 and −120 with a probability of 0.5. Thus, on average, agent 1 will be paid 30
but each time it will incur a cost of 100, thereby making an expected utility of −70. Clearly, then,
a rational agent will not overstate its POS. In fact, the incentive compatibility of this mechanism
arises because an agent i’s expected utility, given it is allocated the task, is:
ui(ĉ, p̂) = pi(τ)
v0(K∗(ĉ, p̂))− ci(K∗(ĉ, p̂))− max
K′∈K−i
(
v0(K
′, p̂)−
∑
j∈I\i
ĉj(K
′)
)
+ (1− pi(τ))
−ci(K∗(ĉ, p̂))− max
K′∈K−i
(
v0(K
′, p̂)−
∑
j∈I\i
ĉj(K
′)
)
= v0(K
∗(ĉ, p̂),p)− ci(K
∗(ĉ, p̂))− max
K′∈K−i
(
v0(K
′, p̂)−
∑
j∈I\i
ĉj(K
′)
)
(8)
Note that the expected utility within this mechanism is the same as what would have been
derived by agents in the naı¨ve extension of the VCG if they were truthful in reporting p. However,
in Porter et al.’s mechanism, agents do not have an incentive to lie. This is because, if p̂i(τ) > pi(τ)
(i.e., the agent over-reports its POS), then the agent might be allocated the task even though:
i 6= arg max
x∈I
[
v0(K
x)px(τ)− cx(K
x)
]
where Kx = τx←0, which means it could be that:
v0(K
∗(ĉ, p̂),p)− ci(K
∗(ĉ, p̂)) < max
K′∈K−i
(
v0(K
′, p̂)−
∑
j∈I\i
ĉj(K
′)
)
This results in the agent deriving a negative utility as per Equation (8). Hence, an agent will not
report higher POS values. A more complete treatment of the proof of the incentive-compatibility
of the mechanism is given in the paper by Porter et al. (2008). Furthermore, the mechanism is also
proven to be individually rational and efficient.
3.3 Allocation with Multiple Reports of Execution Uncertainty
In the previous section, we considered a mechanism in which each agent has only its privately known
estimation of its own uncertainty in task completion. This mechanism considers that the centre can
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only receive a single estimate of each agent’s POS. We now turn our attention to the previously
unconsidered, but more general, case where several agents may have such an estimate. For example,
a number of agents may have interacted with a given data centre provisioning company on many
occasions in the past and therefore acquired a partial view on the POS of that company. Using such
estimates, the centre can obtain a more accurate picture of a given agent’s likely performance if
it combines these different estimates together. This combination results in a better estimate for a
number of reasons, including:
1. Accuracy of estimation: The accuracy of an estimation is typically affected by noise. Thus,
combining a number of observations should lead to a more refined estimate than obtaining a
single point estimate.
2. Personal Preferences: Each agent within the system may have different opinions as to what
constitutes success when attempting a task. As a result, the centre may be willing to assign
more weight to an agent’s estimate if it believes this agent’s perspective is more similar to its
own.
We illustrate the above points by considering the following example:
Example 4. MoviePictures.com is still not satisfied with the solution chosen so far. This is because
PoorRender Ltd still reports that it has a high POS, even though MoviePictures.com has noticed
that they have failed their task on a number of occasions. This is because PoorRender Ltd believes
the images it rendered were of a high enough quality to be used in a feature film while MoviePic-
tures.com believed they were not. MoviePictures.com therefore cannot rely on the agents’ own
perception of their POS to decide on the allocation. Rather, MoviePictures.com wants to ask all
agents to submit their perception about each others’ POS. In so doing, MoviePictures.com aims to
capture the knowledge that agents might have about each other either from previous sub-contracted
tasks or simple observations. To this end, MoviePictures.com needs to devise a mechanism that will
capture all the agents’ perceptions (including its own) into measures of POS for each agent and use
these fused measures in the selection process.
The above example can be modelled by introducing a new variable, the Expected Quality of
Service (EQOS), noted as ηji (τ), which is the perception of each agent i about the POS of agent j
on task τ . Now, the vector of agent i’s EQOS of all agents (including itself) within the system is
noted as ηi = 〈η1i (τ), . . . , ηIi (τ)〉. Furthermore, we shall denote as ηj the EQOS that all agents
within the system (including itself) have about agent j. Thus, in our image rendering example, ηji (τ)
might denote the probability as perceived by agent i that the rendering task is completed according
to a certain level of quality of the computer graphics (which is perceived differently by the different
agents). Then, MoviePictures.com needs a function in order to combine the EQOS of all the agents
so as to give it a resultant POS that the movie is rendered up to its own graphic requirements.
In more detail, given i’s previous personal interaction with j, i can compute, based on the fre-
quency of good and bad interactions, a probability, termed its confidence, in j as the POS. Second,
i can also take into account other agents’ (−i) opinions about j, known as j’s reputation in the so-
ciety, in order to compute the POS of j (Ramchurn et al., 2004). The combination of both measures
is generally captured by the concept of trust, which is defined as the aggregate expectation, derived
from the history of direct interactions and information from other sources, that j will complete the
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task assigned to it. The aggregate trust that agent j will successfully complete task τ for agent 0 is
a function trj0 : [0, 1]|I| → [0, 1].
There are multiple ways in which the trust function could be computed, but it is often captured
as follows:
trj0(η) =
∑
l∈I
wl × η
j
l (9)
where wl ∈ [0, 1] and
∑
wl = 1. This function generates trust as a weighted sum of EQOS values.
In some cases, the η’s are actually considered to be probability distributions and the trust function is
the expected value of the joint distribution constructed from the individually reported distributions
(Teacy et al., 2006; Jurca & Faltings, 2007). Much work exists in the literature that deals with
different ways of combining these distributions such that biases or incompatibilities between agents’
perceptions are taken into account. Essentially, however, they all assign weights to different reports
of the agents and choose the expected value of these reports as the trust in an agent. However, to
date, none of these models actually studies how to get self-interested agents to generate such reports
truthfully along with maximising the social welfare.
Now, a direct mechanism in this case elicits from each agent i, its cost and EQOS vector,
{ci(τ),ηi}, after which the centre decides on the allocation and payments to the agents. In comput-
ing its expected utility in a mechanism, an agent must evaluate the trust, or probability of success,
by the agent who is allocated the task. This raises a conceptual difficulty. How should an agent
treat the other agents’ POS reports in assessing the probability of task completion (as opposed to
computing its best response to their type reports)? The approach we will take in this paper is that
an agent assumes the reported POS of the other agents is truthful in computing the trust in another
agent; more precisely, an agent computes the value of the trust function by using his true EQOS and
the reported EQOS of the other agents. Thus, the trust of agent i that agent j will be able to com-
plete the task is trj0(ηi, η̂−i). As we have already seen, in general a payment to an agent depends
on the reported types of all agents and on whether the task succeeds or fails. To this end, let i(ĉ, η̂)
be the agent who is allocated the task when the vector of reported types is (ĉ, η̂). Then, define
the expected payment to agent i when the true types are (c,η) and the reported types are (ĉ, η̂) as
follows:
Eri(ĉ, η̂; c,η) = ri(ĉ, η̂, κ = 1)tr
i(ĉ,η̂)
0 (ηi, η̂−i) + ri(ĉ, η̂, κ = 0)
[
1− tr
i(ĉ,η̂)
0 (ηi, η̂−i)
]
We should point out that the type of an agent (EQOS plus cost) is multidimensional and, as is
common in a multidimensional world, there could be several type reports that generate the same
expected payment to an agent. We are now ready to define the modified notion of incentive compat-
ibility we will use.2
Definition 7. Incentive compatibility (in Dominant Strategies): the allocation mechanism is said
to achieve incentive compatibility in dominant strategies if an agent’s true type is its optimal report
no matter what the other agents report. That is: ∀c,∀η,∀ĉi,∀η̂i,∀ĉ−i,∀η̂−i,
Eri(ci, ĉ−i,ηi, η̂−i; c,η)− ci(K(ci, ĉ−i)) ≥ Eri(ĉi, ĉ−i, η̂i, η̂−i; c,η)− ci(K(ĉi, ĉ−i))
2. That an agent uses the reported POS of the other agents in computing the value of the trust function seems a natural
assumption when an agent can rely on the other agents truthfully reporting their types. This is the case, for example,
when the history of interactions between the POS reporters is publicly known (e.g., on eBay or Amazon).
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Now, in the case where agents do not view the EQOS reports of the other agents as being
truthful, the trust of agent i that agent j will be able to complete the task may depend on both
true and reported types of all agents; in such a case we could relax the incentive compatibility
requirement from dominant strategy to (ex-post) Nash equilibrium (MasColell et al., 1995), which
means that if all the other agents report truthfully, then it is optimal for an agent always to report its
true type, no matter what the true types of the other agents are. After replacing the new trust function
in the definition of the expected payment to agent i, the definition of incentive compatibility would
change to:
Definition 8. Incentive compatibility (in Nash Equilibrium): the allocation mechanism is said to
achieve incentive compatibility in (ex-post) Nash equilibrium if an agent’s true type is its optimal
report provided other agents report their type truthfully. That is: ∀ci,∀ĉi,∀ηi,∀η̂i,∀c−i,∀η−i,
Eri(ci, c−i,ηi,η−i; c,η)− ci(K(ci, c−i)) ≥ Eri(ĉi, c−i, η̂i,η−i; c,η)− ci(K(ĉi, c−i))
We next demonstrate why Porter et al.’s mechanism would not work in this setting by extending
example 1.
3.3.1 FAILURE OF PORTER ET. AL’S MECHANISM
Example 5. Two agents have costs for performing a task τ requested by the centre and have formed
perceptions on the set of agents I given in Table 2. Suppose that tri0(η) = [ηi1(τ) + ηi2(τ)]/2, and
v0(τ) = 1.
Agent ci(τ i←) η1i (τ) η2i (τ)
1 0 0.6 1
2 0 0.8 0.6
tri0(η) 0.7 0.8
Table 2: Costs and EQOS reports of agents in a single task scenario. The trust of the requester is calculated
assuming truthful reports.
Porter et al. do not specify a procedure that deals with EQOS reports. However, a natural
extension of their technique would be to allocate according to tri0(η̂) instead of p̂i(τ), and to ignore
all reports of agent i in the computation of its payment. We implement this in the above example.
Agent 2 should be the winner since it generates an expected social utility of 0.8, while agent 1 would
generate a utility of 0.7. The expected utility to the agent allocated the task is then (according to
Equation (8)):
ui(ĉ, η̂) = v0(K
∗(ĉ, η̂)) · tri0(ηi, η̂−i)− ci(K
∗(ĉ, η̂))− max
K′∈K−i
[
v0(K
′) · trj
′
0 (η̂−i)− ĉj(K
′)
]
(10)
where η̂−i excludes all η reports by agent i, K−i is the set of allocations excluding agent i, and
j′ is the agent that is allocated the task under allocation K ′. Unfortunately, this extension breaks
incentive compatibility in the following way. Given that the efficient allocation is computed using
the reported η̂ values of all agents (using tr0(η̂) instead of p̂ in Equation (6)), the value of the best
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allocation obtained by removing one agent could be arbitrarily lower. In the example above, if agent
1 reports η21 = 0, the efficient allocation becomes agent 1 with an expected social utility of 0.7 and
agent 1 gets an expected utility of 0.1 because the system’s utility drops to 0.6 when its reports are
removed and the allocation recomputed. If agent 1 is truthful it will obtain 0 utility since agent 2
would be the winner in this case. In effect, the removal of an agent from the system breaks the
mechanism because of the interdependence between the valuations introduced by the trust model.
We elaborate further on this issue and show how to solve it in the next section.
We thus need to develop a mechanism that is incentive-compatible when agents are reporting
about their perceptions of other agents’ POS. In order to do so, however, we now need to additionally
consider the effect that reporting the EQOS vector has on an agent’s expected utility. Specifically,
we need to develop a trust-based mechanism in which the EQOS reports of an agent do not provide
it with a way of increasing its overall expected utility (as per the intuition behind the VCG). Then,
with the true value of the EQOS, the mechanism will result in the selection of the optimal allocation
of tasks.
3.3.2 THE SINGLE REQUESTER SINGLE TASK TRUST-BASED MECHANISM
Intuitively, the following mechanism works by ascertaining that an agent derives a positive utility
when it successfully completes a task and its EQOS report does not change the allocation in its
favour (thus, the mechanism we develop can be regarded as a generalisation of the paper by Porter
et al., 2008).
In more detail, let i(K) be the agent performing the task under allocation K; the centre first
determines the allocation according to:
K∗(ĉ, η̂) = arg max
K∈K
[
v0(K) · tr
i(K)
0 (η̂)−
∑
i∈I
ĉi(K)
]
(11)
Having computed the efficient allocation as above, we adopt a similar approach to Porter et
al.’s to compute the payments after tasks have been executed (see section 3.2.2). However, the
novelty of our mechanism lies in the use of all agents’ EQOS reports in the computation of the
efficient allocation (as we showed above). Moreover, we have additional payments for the losers to
incentivise all agents to select the efficient allocation.
Thus, we apply different payments to the cases where the agent winning the allocation succeeds
(i.e., κ = 1) and when it fails (i.e., κ = 0). So if agent i is allocated the task (i.e., K∗ = {τ i←0})
the payment is:
ri(ĉ, η̂, κ) =

v0(K
∗(ĉ, η̂))−Bi(ĉ−i, η̂−i) , if κ = 1
−Bi(ĉ−i, η̂−i) , if κ = 0
(12)
where Bi(·) ≥ 0 is a term independent from i’s report (a constant from i’s point of view) that
reduces the payment that needs to be made to the agent. We briefly discuss how the value of Bi(·)
could be set to reduce the payout made by the centre later in this section, and we provide greater
detail in section 4.4.
In addition to paying the winner, we also reward the losers k ∈ I \ i in the following way,
depending on whether i succeeds or not:
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rk(ĉ, η̂, κ) =

v0(K
∗(ĉ, η̂))− ĉi(K
∗(ĉ, η̂))−Bk(ĉ−k, η̂−k) , if κ = 1
− ĉi(K
∗(ĉ, η̂))−Bk(ĉ−k, η̂−k) , if κ = 0
(13)
Intuitively, the payment scheme aims to incentivise all agents to reveal their type so that the
most efficient allocation is chosen. Let Ki0 be the allocation assigning the task to agent i. Suppose
agent i with type (ci,ηi) reports its type as (ĉi, η̂i) and all other agents report (ĉ−i, η̂−i). When
agent i wins the task, it will derive the following expected utility:
ui
(
Ki0,ηi, η̂−i
)
= v0
(
Ki0
)
· tri0
(
ηi, η̂−i
)
− ci
(
Ki0
)
−Bi(ĉ−i, η̂−i) (14)
Note that tri0
(
ηi, η̂−i
)
reflects the true POS of agent i. When agent k 6= i is assigned the task,
agent i obtains the following expected utility by participating in the mechanism:
ui
(
Kk0 ,ηi, η̂−i
)
= v0
(
Kk0
)
· trk0
(
ηi, η̂−i
)
− ĉk
(
Kk0
)
−Bi(ĉ−i, η̂−i) (15)
The only difference between Equations (14) and (15) is the identity of the winner. Hence, by
falsely reporting, agent i can only influence the identity of the winner. Agent i’s expected utility
in the mechanism is equal to the expected social utility in the system minus a constant independent
of i’s report. Hence, if agent i is rational it should report its true type, so that the efficient agent
(outcome) is chosen. This shows that the single task trust-based mechanism is incentive compatible
and efficient.3
Proposition 1. The mechanism described by Equations (11), (12), and (13) is incentive compatible.
Proposition 2. The mechanism described by Equations (11), (12), and (13) is efficient.
Proof. Since agent k’s report about ηk affects the expected utility of all other agents (see Equations
(14) and (15)), we have interdependence between agents’ payoffs, or valuations. However, no agent
can influence its own transfer through its report, because the computation of agent i’s payment is
independent of its report η̂i (and ĉi) and is only dependent on the actual execution of the task and
therefore on the true ηi value. It is this feature that permits the implementation of the efficient
allocation with a single-stage mechanism.
To exemplify the payments in our mechanism, consider the following extension of Example 5.
Example 6. Two agents have zero cost for performing a task τ requested by the centre and have
EQOS ηji (τ) ∈ {0.6, 0.7, 0.8} for i, j = 1, 2. Suppose that tri0(η) = [ηi1(τ) + ηi2(τ)]/2, and
v0(τ) = 1.
By setting Bi = 0.6 in the above example, we have that the payment to each agent when the
task is completed successfully is 0.4, while the payment when the task fails is −0.6. Hence, the
centre profits from implementing the mechanism. Agents have an incentive to report truthfully, so
that the agent most likely to succeed is allocated the task. Furthermore, all agents are willing to
participate, because the probability of success is at least 0.6 (it is 0.6 in the worst case scenario)
3. We provide a more detailed proof for the generalised case in Section 4.3.
16
TRUST-BASED MECHANISMS FOR ROBUST AND EFFICIENT TASK ALLOCATION
and hence, agents expect to obtain at least zero from participating: the mechanism is individu-
ally rational. Also note that the total expected payment from the centre to all agents is at most
0.8× 0.4× 2− 0.2× 0.6× 2 = 0.4, but could be as low as 0.6× 0.4× 2− 0.4× 0.6× 2 = 0. As
we now show, Bi can always be chosen so that individual rationality is satisfied.
Proposition 3. For an appropriate choice of Bi(·), the mechanism described by Equations (11),
(12), and (13) is individually rational.
Proof. By not participating in the mechanism, an agent can only obtain 0 utility. However, if an
agent decides to participate, and by virtue of the selection of the efficient allocation (which returns
no allocation if the social welfare generated is less than 0), it is guaranteed, as a winner, to obtain
the utility ui described in Equation (14) or, as a loser, the utility uk in Equation (15). Since in both
cases ui ≥ −Bi(·) when the efficient allocation is chosen, and Bi can be set to 0, the mechanism is
individually rational.
Obviously, since all agents’ utilities are tied to that of the winning agent, they also lose out if
the winning agent fails but, in expectation, all agents make a profit of at least 0 in case Bi is set to
0. As Example 6 shows, if the centre is trying to minimise payments (and increase its own profits),
it could set Bi to be greater than zero and still satisfy individual rationality. In Section 4.4, we
show how to set Bi to a value that maintains individual rationality while minimising payments in
the general model.
Here we note that sometimes it may be preferable for the centre to give up individual rationality.
Consider, for example, if we modify Example 6 to allow for an additional EQOS value ηji (τ) = 0.3
for i, j = 1, 2. To induce type ηji (τ) = 0.3 to participate, the centre could set Bi(·) = 0.3,
so that the payment following success is 0.7 and the payment after failure is −0.3. In the worst
case scenario for the centre (i.e., when the centre’s profit is the lowest), the total expected payment
in this mechanism is 0.8 × 0.7 × 2 − 0.2 × 0.3 × 2 = 1 (in the best case scenario, the total
expected payment is zero). As we shall see in Section 4.4, the centre could substantially reduce
its payments by making Bi(·) depend on the report of the other agents (i.e., other than i). Still, it
may be preferable for the centre to set Bi(·) = 0.6, giving up on the participation of agents with
EQOS values ηii(τ) = ηji (τ) = 0.3. In general, when there are low EQOS types, the centre faces
a trade off between efficient task allocation and payments minimisation. We leave the study of this
trade-off to future work (see Section 6 for some initial thoughts).
4. The Generalised Trust-Based Mechanism
The mechanisms we presented in the previous section dealt with the basic task allocation problem
in which there is one requester, one task, and several performers. Here, we aim to efficiently solve
the more general problem of trust-based interactions in which more than one agent requests or
performs (or both) more than one task. To this end, we extend the single requester single task
setting to the more general one of multiple requesters and multiple tasks in our Generalised Trust-
Based Mechanism (GTBM). This extension needs to consider a number of complex features on
top of those dealt with previously. First, we need to consider multiple requesters that can each
make requests for sets of tasks and task performers that can each perform sets of tasks as well.
Thus, the centre now acts as a clearing house, determining the allocation and payments from the
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multiple bids from the task requesters and multiple asks from the task performers. This significantly
complicates the problem of incentivising agents to reveal their types since we now have to make
sure that the agents reveal their costs, valuations, and EQOS truthfully over more than one task.
Second, the computation of the efficient allocation and payments will have to consider a much larger
space than previously. Thus, we believe it is important to show how the problem can be modelled,
implemented, and solved to demonstrate how our mechanism scales with increasing numbers of
agents and tasks (the computability aspects are dealt with in Section 5).
The following example illustrates this more general setting.
Example 7. After using the trust-based mechanism for a few months, MoviePictures.com made
significant profits and expanded into several independent business units, each performing rendering
tasks or having rendering tasks performed for certain clients. Now, MoviePictures.com would like
to find ways in which its business units can efficiently allocate tasks amongst themselves. However,
some companies have uncertainties about each other’s performance of the rendering tasks. For
example, while some business units, such as HighDefFilms.com, believe PoorRender Ltd (now part
of MoviePictures.com) is inefficient, some others, such as GoodFilms.com, believe it is not so bad,
having recently had a large set of animations rendered very well for a very cheap price. To cater for
these differences in opinion while maximising the overall utility, MoviePictures.com needs to extend
the single task trust-based mechanism and implement the generalised mechanism efficiently.
In order to deal with this more complex setting, we extend our task allocation model in the next
subsection, before describing the allocation rule and payment scheme in Section 4.2 and proving
the economic properties of the mechanism in Section 4.3.
4.1 The Extended Task Allocation Setting
Let T = {τ1, τ2, ..., τM} denote the set of tasks which can be requested or performed (compared
to the single task before). We use the notation τ .←i to specify that the subset of tasks τ ⊆ T is
performed specifically for agent i.4 Similarly, by adding the superscript to the task, τ i←. ⊆ K
denotes a subset of tasks that agent i performs. Note that there is nothing in our model that restricts
an agent to be only a task performer or requester.
A selected allocation K in this multiple task, multiple requester model then generates a match-
ing problem that involves finding agents that will perform the tasks that are requested by some other
agents (e.g., K = {τ1←11 , τ1←21 , . . . , τ I−1←I1 , . . . , τ I←IM }). Let the set of all possible allocations be
denoted as K. Note that not all requested tasks need to be allocated: that is, the matching in K need
not be perfect.
In the multiple task case, agents may express valuations and costs for sets of tasks as well as
subsets of these sets of tasks. For example, agent i may have vi(τ1, τ2, τ3) = 100 and vi(τ1, τ2) =
10 and vi(τ3) = 0. Then, if agent i gets τ1, τ2 and τ3 executed it gets a value of 100, while if
only τ1 and τ2 get executed and τ3 fails, agent i still obtains a value of 10. Similarly, agent i may
have task execution costs ci(τ4, τ5, τ6) = 100 and ci(τ4, τ5) = 40 and ci(τ6) = 10. To capture
such inter-relationships between valuations, let Kji be the set of tasks within the allocation K which
have to be performed by agent j for agent i (Kji could be the empty set). Note that each task is
specific to a task requester. This means that if agents 1 and 2 request task τm, then a task performer
4. In this paper, we will not consider agents requesting the performance of multiple units of tasks. Although our model
is easily extensible to this case, the explanation is much more intricate.
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(putting in one bid for τm) matched to τm for agent 1, only performs it for agent 1 and not for agent
2. We will abuse notation slightly and define K = {Ki,Ki}i∈I where Ki = (K1i , ...,KIi ) and
Ki = (Ki1, ...,K
i
I). An agent i has a value (assuming all the tasks in K will be completed) and cost
for an allocation K, vi(K) ∈ ℜ+ ∪ {0} and ci(K) ∈ ℜ+ ∪ {0} respectively, whereby:5
vi(K) = vi(Ki)
ci(K) = ci(K
i)
Moreover, within our model, each agent i has an EQOS vector, ηi = {ηji (Kh)}Kh⊆Kj,h∈I that
represents its belief in how successful all agents within the system are at completing the tasks Kh
for agent h. Thus, at the most general level, agent i’s type is now given by θi = {vi, ci,ηi}. For any
given set of tasks Kji that j must perform for i, for any subset of tasks K˜
j
i ⊆ K
j
i and for any EQOS
vector η, we let trji
(
K˜ji
∣∣∣Kji ,η) be the trust that exactly the set of tasks K˜ji will be completed by
j. The trust can be computed as we have shown in Section 3.3 by simply replacing agent 0 with
agent i and replacing the single task by the set of tasks T . As in the single requester case, the trust
function represents the aggregate belief that agents have about a given task performer and hence all
task requesters form the same probability of success (give all agents’ EQOS reports) about a given
task performer. Finally, we let tri
(
K˜i
∣∣∣Ki,η) = ∏
j∈I
trji
(
K˜ji
∣∣∣Kji ,η) .
We are now ready to present the generalised trust-based mechanism.
4.2 The Allocation Rule and Payment Scheme
In our generalised mechanism (GTBM), the task requesters first provide the centre with a list of
tasks they require to be performed, along with their valuation vector associated with each set of
tasks, whereas the task performers provide their costs for performing sets of tasks.6 All agents
also submit their EQOS vector to the centre. Thus, each agent provides the centre with reports
θ̂i = {v̂i, ĉi, η̂i}, so that θ̂ = (θ̂1, ..., θ̂I) is the report profile. Given this, the centre applies the
rules of the mechanism in order to find the allocation K∗ and net payments ri to each agent i. In
more detail:
1. The centre computes the allocation according to the following:
K∗
(
θ̂
)
= arg max
K={Ki,Ki}i∈I∈K
∑
i∈I
 ∑
K˜i⊆Ki
v̂i(K˜i) · tri
(
K˜i
∣∣∣Ki, η̂)− ĉi(K)
 (16)
Thus, the centre uses the reports of the agents in order to find the allocation that maximises
the expected utility of all agents within the system.
2. The agents carry out the tasks allocated to them in the allocation vector K∗
(
θ̂
)
.
5. As a result of this setup, an agent i may not want some sets of tasks to be performed or it may be unable to perform
such tasks. In such cases, we then assign a default value of 0 and cost of∞ to those sets of tasks.
6. As noted before, task performers can also be task requesters at the same time (and vice versa).
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3. The centre computes the payments to the agents, conditional on completion of the tasks allo-
cated. Let κ(Ki) be an indicator function that takes the value one if Ki is the set of all the
tasks (requested by agent i from all agents) that are completed, and takes the value of zero
otherwise. The payment to agent i is as follows:
ri
(
θ̂, κ(·)
)
=
∑
j∈I\i
 ∑
K˜j⊆K∗j (θ̂)
v̂j
(
K˜j
)
· κ
(
K˜j
)
− ĉj
(
K∗
(
θ̂
))−Bi(θ̂−i) (17)
where Bi(θ̂−i) ≥ 0 is a constant from i’s point of view (i.e., it is computed independently
of agent i’s reports, but it may depend on the reports of the other agents), that can be used to
reduce the payout that the centre has to make.
As we discussed in Section 3.3.2, the centre faces a trade-off. By reducing the value of Bi(·)
it induces participation by a larger set of types (i.e., types with low EQOS), but it increases the
centre’s payments to agents, making the mechanism less profitable for the centre. Thus, the
scale of the payments one might expect from application of the GTBM depends on whether
the centre decides to satisfy the individual rationality constraint, thus making sure that every
type wants to participate. As we shall see in Section 4.4, if the centre decides to satisfy the
individual rationality constraint, then the scale of payments to agent i increases with the lower
bound on trust values that could be derived using i’s EQOS report.
It should also be noted that the computation of the payments requires solving several opti-
misation problems (i.e., finding the optimal allocation with and without several reports). As
the number of agents increases, the difficulty of computing payments will increase and it is
important to show how such payments can be efficiently computed. We elaborate on our
solution to this in Section 5. Before doing so, however, we detail and prove the economic
properties of our mechanism in what follows.
4.3 Economic Properties
Here, we provide the proofs of the incentive compatibility7 and efficiency of the mechanism. We
also prove that there are values of Bi which make the mechanism individually rational.
Proposition 4. The GTBM is incentive compatible.
Proof. In order to prove incentive-compatibility, we will analyse agent i’s best response ( i.e., its
best report of θ̂i = {v̂i, ĉi, η̂i})) when all other agents report θ̂−i. We first calculate the expected
utility that an agent i will derive given the above mechanism.
7. Again, we place the same caveat on the notion of incentive compatibility we use here as we do in in Section 3.3 (i.e.,
Dominant Strategy or (ex-post) Nash equilibrium depending on whether an agent computes the trust functions by
using the other agents’ POS reports as if they were true or not).
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The expected utility of an agent i when the reported types are θ̂ and the true types are θ is given
by:
ui
(
θ̂;θ
)
=
∑
K˜i⊆K∗i
(
θ̂i,θ̂−i
) vi(K˜i) · tri
(
K˜i|K
∗
i
(
θ̂i, θ̂−i
)
,ηi, η̂−i
)
− ci
(
K∗
(
θ̂i, θ̂−i
))
+ Eri
(
θ̂;θ
) (18)
where Eri is the expectation of ri taken with respect to the likelihood of task completion. The
probability attached by i to the indicator variable κ(K˜j) being equal to one (i.e., all tasks K˜j being
completed), given that the set of tasks requested by j is Kj and all agents different from i report
θ̂−i, is trj
(
K˜j
∣∣∣Kj ,ηi, η̂−i). Hence, we can now use the formula for the payments to obtain:
Eri
(
θ̂;θ
)
=
∑
j∈I\i

∑
K˜j⊆K∗j
(
θ̂i,θ̂−i
) v̂j
(
K˜j
)
· trj
(
K˜j
∣∣∣K∗j (θ̂i, θ̂−i) ,ηi, η̂−i)
− ĉj
(
K∗
(
θ̂i, θ̂−i
))
−Bi(θ̂−i)
(19)
If we replace the expression above into the formula for ui we can observe that an agent can only
affect its utility with its report by changing K∗(θ̂). The key point to note is that the agent computes
the value of the trust function using the true value of ηi ( rather than its reported value η̂i ).
Now, Equation (16) implies that for all allocations K:
ui
(
θi, θ̂−i;θ
)
≥ ui
(
θ̂i, θ̂−i;θ
)
, (20)
because the efficient allocation, computed by taking into account i’s true type θi and the reported
types of all other agents θ̂−i is better than or equal to any other allocation.
Given the above condition and since Equation (20) applies to all possible realisations of θ, the
mechanism is incentive compatible.
Proposition 5. The GTBM is efficient.
Proof. Given the incentive compatibility of the mechanism, the centre will receive truthful reports
from all the agents. As a result, it will compute the allocation according to Equation (16), thereby
leading to an efficient outcome.
Proposition 6. There exist values of Bi(·) such that the GTBM is individually rational.
Proof. We again begin by making the standard assumption that the agent derives ui = 0, when not
participating in the mechanism. Then, it remains to be shown that the agent derives non-negative
utility from the mechanism. Since the efficient allocation is chosen (and is at worst a null allocation),
the expected utility of each agent is always greater than or equal to −Bi(·) according to Equation
(18). Since Bi(·) can be set to 0, the mechanism is individually rational.
Note that there are possibly many other values ofBi(θ−i), besidesBi = 0, that guarantee individual
rationality.
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Speaking more generally, it can easily be seen that the GTBM mechanism of the multiple task,
multiple requester scenario is a generalisation of the GTBM mechanism with a single requester and
a single task. It is also a generalisation of the mechanism of Porter et al. where they simply assume
that each agent only has an EQOS about its own probability of success. Moreover, in the paper by
Porter et al. for example, Bi is specified as follows:
Bi(θ̂−i) = max
K′∈K−i
(
v0(K
′) · p̂−i(τ)−
∑
j∈I\i
ĉj(K
′)
)
where p̂−i(τ) is the reported probability of completion of the agent assigned the task in allocation
K ′ and K−i is the set of allocations excluding agent i.
4.4 Extracting the Minimum Marginal Contribution
Up to now, we have considered that Bi(θ−i) could be set to arbitrary values to try and reduce
the payments made by the centre to all the agents. More interestingly, it should be possible, as
in the standard VCG mechanism, to only pay an agent its marginal contribution to the system.
However, in our case, due to the interdependence of valuations, it is not as simple as comparing the
social welfare with and without a given agent in the system as is commonly done in VCG-based
mechanisms (Porter et al., 2008 is an obvious example of this). This is because, in our case, when
an agent is removed from the domain used to compute the efficient allocation, the remaining EQOS
reports can arbitrarily change the allocation value. This could, in turn, be exploited by other agents
to improve their utility. The example in Section 3.3.1 showing the failure of a simple extension of
Porter et al.’s mechanism illustrates this point.
Assuming that the centre wants to induce participation by all agent types, here we propose a
novel approach to extracting the marginal contribution of an agent, by taking into account EQOS
reports of other agents and possible reports that the agent could make. LetK−i be the set of possible
allocations when agent i is excluded from society. The value of Bi(·) can be chosen such that it is
equivalent to the social utility of the mechanism when agent i is excluded and its EQOS reports are
chosen so as to minimise social utility, that is:
Bi(θ̂−i) = min
ηi∈[0,1]|I|×|T |
max
K∈K−i
∑
j∈I\i
 ∑
K˜j⊆Kj
v̂j
(
K˜j
)
· trj
(
K˜j
∣∣∣Kj ,ηi, η̂−i)− ĉj (K)
 (21)
It is to be noted that Bi is computed using the lowest trust values that could be derived using i’s
EQOS reports.
Then, the generalised payment scheme is:
ri
(
θ̂, κ(.)
)
=
∑
j∈I\i
 ∑
K˜j⊆K∗j
(
θ̂
) v̂j
(
K˜j
)
· κ
(
K˜j
)
− ĉj
(
K∗
(
θ̂
))
− min
ηi∈[0,1]|I|×|T |
max
K∈K−i
∑
j∈I\i
 ∑
K˜j⊆Kj
v̂j
(
K˜j
)
· trj
(
K˜j
∣∣∣Kj ,ηi, η̂−i)− ĉj (K)

(22)
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The point to note here is that incentive compatibility (and hence efficiency of the mechanism)
still holds given that the payment scheme is still independent of i’s reports. In fact, ri rewards i with
the maximum difference that agent i could make by setting all elements in ηi to different values in
[0, 1]|I|×|T |.8
This procedure reduces the payments made by the centre, while keeping individual rationality
since the value of the efficient allocation (given incentive compatibility as proven earlier) is always
higher than or equal to the value of Bi, which means that:
ui (K
∗(θ),θ) =
∑
j∈I
 ∑
K˜j⊆K∗j (θ)
vj
(
K˜j
)
· trj
(
K˜j
∣∣∣K∗j (θ) ,η)− cj (K∗ (θ))

− min
η
i
∈[0,1]|I|×|T |
max
K∈K−i
∑
j∈I\i
 ∑
K˜j⊆Kj
vj
(
K˜j
)
· trj
(
K˜j
∣∣∣Kj ,ηi,η−i)− cj (K)
 ≥ 0;
It is also to be noted that the above equation implies that there is no restriction placed on the
functional form of the trust function tr for the payment scheme to work and for the properties of
the mechanism to hold. This is an improvement on previous mechanisms (see Section 2) which had
considered trust functions that are only monotonically increasing in ηi for each i.
Now, the choice of Bi determines whether the centre runs the mechanism at a profit or not.
Hence, to understand what the scale of payments may be in the GTBM discussed in this section,
consider the following example.
Example 8. There are n agents, I = {1, ..., n}, each requiring that a single task be performed
for them. All agents have value 1 for the task to be performed for them and have zero cost for
performing all tasks. The EQOS of agent h about agent i’s probability of succeeding at the task for
agent j is ηih(Kj) ∈ [x, 1] for all h, i, j = 1, ..., n. Suppose that trij(η) =
[∑
h∈I η
i
h(Kj)
]
/n.
In the above example, the EQOS of each agent are in the interval [x, 1], so that x can be viewed
as the lower bound on the expected probability of success at each task. From Equation (21) we can
compute the value of Bi:
Bi(θ−i) =
∑
j∈I\i
max
ℓ∈I
[∑
h∈I\i η
ℓ
h(Kj) + x
n
]
Note that, depending on the value of η−i, Bi(θ−i) could be any value between (n − 1)x and
(n− 1)(n− 1 + x)/n; Bi increases with the lower bound x on agents’ EQOS. The actual payment
to agent i will depend on the success or failure of each task (e.g., the payment is −Bi if all tasks
fail). From Equation (19), we can calculate the value of the expected payment to agent i as:
Eri (θ) =
∑
j∈I\i
max
ℓ∈I
[∑
h∈I
ηℓh(Kj)
n
]
−Bi(θ−i)
≤
∑
j∈I\i
[
η
ℓ∗(j)
i − x
n
]
8. This minimisation takes place over the domain of trust values which could be other than [0, 1] in the general case.
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where ℓ∗(j) is the agent allocated the task for agent j under the efficient allocation rule. Let EV be
the total expected value from all tasks:
EV (θ) =
∑
j∈I
[∑
i∈I η
ℓ∗(j)
i
n
]
Note that the total expected value of all tasks is greater than the sum of the expected payments
over all agents, that is:
∑
j∈I
[∑
i∈I η
ℓ∗(j)
i
n
]
>
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈I\i
[
η
ℓ∗(j)
i − x
n
]
Thus, the centre always profits from the mechanism. A lower bound on the difference between total
expected value and total expected payments is [
∑
i∈I η
ℓ∗(i)
i +(n− 1)x]/n. Note also that the lower
bound on the centre’s profit from the mechanism increases with the lower bound on EQOS x.
As we pointed out in the discussion of Example 6 in Section 3.3.2, if the centre is trying to min-
imise payments, it could give up on individual rationality, by increasing Bi, at the cost of inducing
some agent types not to participate in the mechanism. This may be appealing when the probability
of task failure is high; in such cases, the centre may prefer to avoid paying an amount almost as large
as the total value of the tasks. On the other hand, in a number of practical applications the centre
may want to use the mechanism that induces participation by all types, described in this section.
This is certainly the case, for example, if the lower bound on EQOS (i.e., the lower bound on the
probability that tasks are successful) is high. Moreover, our mechanism with participation by all
types is appropriate when the centre mainly seeks to maximise social welfare. Consider, for exam-
ple, a government that is trying to boost the economy through major public infrastructure projects.
In order to do so, it may be willing to invest in the trust-based mechanism to get the best infrastruc-
tures built at the cheapest cost. Moreover, the government may be willing to make a low profit in
order to ensure the survivability of the construction companies by guaranteeing them some payoff
if they participate in the mechanism. Another example where a company might want to involve all
task performers would be a company trying to acquire as much information as possible about all
task performers in order to maximise the returns on its future decisions. Following from our run-
ning scenario, say MovePictures.com needs to contract a video editing company to add computer
graphics to a movie that may become a blockbuster if the graphics are well done. In case the task
is successful, MoviePictures.com is likely to get many contracts in the future. It is therefore critical
that all the available information is collected from agents in order to choose the most reliable video
editing company. In this case, MoviePictures.com may accept a smaller short-run profit by running
our mechanism with full participation, in order to guarantee that the selected agent is the best one
and that future contracts will be obtained.
To summarise, in this section we have devised a mechanism that is incentive compatible, indi-
vidually rational and efficient for task allocation under uncertainty when multiple distributed reports
are used in order to judge this uncertainty. It is to be noted that we did not need two-stage mecha-
nisms, as in the work of Mezzetti (2004), because in our settings we can condition payments on the
completion of the tasks (the indicator function κ (·) captures this dependence of payments on task
completion). So far, we have just considered the economic properties of the mechanisms, but as we
argued earlier, this is only part of the picture. In the next section, we report on its implementation.
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5. Implementing the Generalised Trust-Based Mechanism
As shown above, the addition of trust to the basic task allocation problem not only complicates the
payment scheme, but also requires a larger number of important optimisation steps than the normal
VCG. In more detail, trust-based mechanisms require that agents specify an expected value for a set
of tasks depending on the performer of such tasks which, in turn, means that the space of solutions to
be explored is significantly larger than in common task allocation problems. Moreover, the payment
scheme of trust-based mechanisms requires finding the efficient allocation multiple times with and
without the agents’ reports. With this added level of complexity, it is important to show that the
mechanisms are actually implementable and that solutions can be found for usefully sized problems
in reasonable time.9
Against the above background, in this section we describe the first formulation and implemen-
tation of the GTBM. In particular, in the GTBM, we tackle the main optimisation problem posed
by Equation (16) (which is then repeated several times in the payment scheme). This is commonly
referred to as the winner determination problem in combinatorial auctions. In order to solve it,
we take insight from solutions to combinatorial exchanges which often map the problem to a well
studied matching problem (Kalagnanam & Parkes, 2004; Engel, Wellman, & Lochner, 2006). In
so doing, we develop a novel representation of the optimisation problem by using hypergraphs to
describe the relationships between valuations, trust, and bids by task performers and then cast the
problem as a special hypergraph matching problem. Given this representation, we are then able
to solve the problem using Integer Programming techniques through a concise formulation of the
objective function and constraints.
5.1 Representing the Search Space
It is important to define the search space in such a way that relationships between valuations, bids,
trust, and tasks can be clearly and concisely captured. In particular, our representation aims to map
the GTBM optimisation problem to a matching problem that has been well studied in the literature.
To do this, the representation must allow us to define the whole space of feasible task allocations,
and, subsequently, define how to select them as valid solutions to the GTBM optimisation problem.
Now, to allow bidders (task performers) and askers (task requesters) to express their bids and valua-
tions in a consistent and implementable way, we choose the XOR bidding language. Such a bidding
language requires that an auctioneer can accept at most one bid out of each XOR bid and that each
XOR bid can belong to only one agent. We choose this particular bidding language because it has
been shown that any valuation can be expressed using it (Nisan, 2006).10 An example of an XOR
bid in our context would be {ci(τ1, τ2)XOR ci(τ1, τ3)XOR ci(τ1, τ2, τ3)}which means that agent
i would only go for one of these three bids over tasks τ1, τ2 and τ3 (ci could also be replaced by
vi for task requesters). In terms of our running example, such a bid would express PoorRender
Ltd’s cost for performing a sound editing task (i.e., τ1), a movie production task (i.e., τ2), or both in
combination (i.e., τ1, τ2).
9. It is already known that computing the efficient allocation and payments for VCG mechanisms is NP-hard (Sandholm,
Suri, Gilpin, & Levine, 2002). Therefore, finding efficient solutions to VCG mechanisms is already a significant
challenge in its own right.
10. Other bidding languages (such as those describing Atomic or OR bids, as in Nisan, 2006) could equally well be used
in our model and would only require minor changes to the constraints that we need to apply.
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Figure 1: Graphical representation of the GTBM search space. Nodes of the same colour represent valuation
or cost nodes that belong to the same agent (here nodes with v1 belong to agent 1 and those with c4 belong
to agent 4). Edges of the same colour either originate from the same node or end up at the same node.
To build the overall representation of the problem, we first focus on representing expected val-
uations and costs as well as their relationships. These are depicted in Figure 1. In more detail, we
specify three types of nodes: (1) valuations (along the V column); (2) bids (under the C column);
and (3) task-per-bidder nodes (under the A column). Each node vi(τ ) in the V column stands for a
valuation submitted by agent i over a set of tasks τ ⊆ T . Each node cj(τ ) in the C column stands
for a bid issued by agent j over tasks τ ⊆ T . Each element of A represents the allocation τ j←.m of
a single task τm ∈ T to task performer (bidder) j by a task requester yet to be determined (repre-
sented by a dot). In other words, the elements in A represent patterns for single-task allocations.
We term such elements task-per-bidder nodes.
Note that it is possible that different valuations come from the same requester. If so they are
labelled by the same subscript. Moreover, since we have opted for an XOR bidding language,
valuations belonging to the very same requester are mutually exclusive.
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5.1.1 DEFINING RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN VALUATIONS, TASKS, AND BIDS
Given the nodes defined by A, V , and C, by relating a node τ j←.m in A to a node vi(..., τm, ...) in V
we define the assignment of task τm by i to j through the specific valuation vi(..., τm, ...). Similarly,
by relating a node τ j←.m inA to a node cj(..., τm, ...) in C we define the assignment of the task to the
specific bid cj(..., τm, ...) by agent j. Therefore, a triple (v, τ j←.m , c) where v ∈ V, τ j←.m ∈ A, c ∈ C
fully characterises an allocation for task τm, namely a single-task allocation. Hence, as can be seen
in Figure 1, we define two types of relationships: between valuations and task-per-bidder nodes
(noted by edges e1, e2, ...), and between bids and task-per-bidder nodes (noted by edges e′1, e′2, ...).11
Using these relationships, a valuation can then be related to a set of task-per-bidder nodes if and
only if these fully cover the performance of the task(s) in the valuation. For instance, we can relate
v1(τ1, τ2) to nodes τ4←.1 (agent 4 performs task τ1) and τ2←.2 (agent 2 performs task τ2) because
they guarantee the performance of tasks τ1 and τ2. Similar to valuation relationships, each node C
is only related to the set of task-per-bidder nodes in A into which each bid splits. Thus, in Figure 1,
bid c4(τ1) is only related to τ4←.1 , whereas bid c2(τ2, τ3) is related to nodes τ2←.2 and τ2←.3 .
Thus, we can identify the task performers for each task in a given valuation. This is critical since
the GTBM, contrary to common task allocation mechanisms (such as VCG or Mth price auctions),
requires that we identify exactly who performs a task in order to determine the POS of that task (by
virtue of the requester’s trust in the performer) and hence the expected value of the task.
As can be seen, our representation allows us to capture all tasks and performers of such tasks
since each valuation node in V can be potentially related to multiple nodes inA; and, likewise, each
bid in the C column can be potentially related to multiple nodes in A. To capture these related rela-
tionships precisely, we define special edges that can connect several nodes (e.g., the ones depicted as
e1, e2,· · · ,e
′
1, e
′
2,... in Figure 1). Such edges are termed hyperedges because they combine a number
of singleton edges. Hence, Figure 1 can be best described as a hypergraph (Berge, 1973). In order
to precisely define the matching problem that the GTBM poses, we elaborate on the formalism of
hypergraphs since this will help in concisely expressing the problem later on. More specifically, the
formal notion of hypergraphs, as introduced in the paper by Berge (1973), is:
Definition 9. Hypergraph. Let X = {x1, x2, . . . , xn} be a finite set of n elements, and let E =
{ej |j ∈ J} be a family of subsets of X where J = {1, 2, ...}. The family E is said to be a hypergraph
on X if:
1. ej 6= ∅ (∀j ∈ J)
2. ∪j∈Jej = X .
The pair H = (X, E) is called a hypergraph. The elements x1, x2, . . . , xn are called the vertices
and the sets e1, e2, . . . , ej are called the hyperedges.
We say that a hypergraph is weighted if we associate to each hyperedge e ∈ E a real number,
w(e), called the weight of e. This is used to give more or less importance to some edges.
From the formal definition of hypergraphs, we observe that Figure 1 results from the overlap-
ping of two separate hypergraphs: (i) the valuation hypergraph that occurs from linking valuations
11. Figure 1 only depicts a sample of all possible relationships for ease of illustration.
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to task-per-bidder nodes; and (ii) the bid hypergraph that occurs from linking each bid to the corre-
sponding task-per-bidder nodes. In what follows, we formally define both hypergraphs from valu-
ations and bids so that later on we can structurally characterise the notions of feasible and optimal
allocations.
5.1.2 THE VALUATION HYPERGRAPH
The valuation hypergraph highlights the main difference between the GTBM and the common com-
binatorial exchanges (e.g., those based on traditional VCG or Mth-price auctions). In particular, in
the GTBM valuations need to take into account the trust of the task requester in the task performer
while, in normal combinatorial exchanges, task requesters are indifferent to task performers. This
means the weight of each hyperedge in a valuation hypergraph is dependent on trust and a large
number of edges need to be generated (one per task performer) which is not the case in normal
combinatorial exchanges.
To define the valuation hypergraph, we need to define hyperedges that emanate from each node
in V to one or more nodes in A. To this end, let V = {vi(τ ) 6= 0|τ ⊆ T , i ∈ I} and C = {cj(τ ) 6=
∞|τ ⊆ T , j ∈ I} be the sets of all valuations and all bids respectively. Let τ j←. = {τ ∈ T |
∃τ ′ ⊆ T : cj(τ ) 6= ∞ and τ ∈ τ ′} be the set of tasks over which agent j submits bids. Hence,
A = {τ j←.k |τk ∈ τ
j←., j ∈ I, cj(τ ) ∈ C} is the set containing all the tasks bid by each bidder.12
Furthermore, we need to define some auxiliary sets as follows. Given a valuation over a set of
tasks τ , a set of nodes A ⊆ A fulfils it if and only if:⋃
τ
j←.
k
∈A
{τ j←.k } = τ and |τ | = |A|
For instance, the set of nodes A = {τ4←.1 , τ2←.2 } fulfils any valuation over {τ1, τ2}. Hence, the
subsets of A that fulfil a valuation over a set of tasks τ are expressed using Aτ which is defined as:
Aτ = {A ⊆ A |
⋃
τ
j←.
k
∈A
{τ j←.k } = τ and |τ | = |A|}
For instance, considering the example in Figure 1,
A{τ1,τ2} = {{τ4←.1 , τ
4←.
2 }, {τ
4←.
1 , τ
2←.
2 }, {τ
4←.
1 , τ
5←.
2 }}
A{τ1,τ3} = {{τ4←.1 , τ
4←.
3 }, {τ
4←.
1 , τ
2←.
3 }}
Given the above definitions, we can now define the set of all hyperedges connected to a valuation
vi(τ ) ∈ V as:
Evi (τ ) = ∪a∈Aτ {{vi(τ )} ∪ a}
For instance, from Figure 1:
Ev1 (τ1, τ2) = {e1, e2, e3} and Ev1 (τ3) = {e4, e5},
where e1 = {v1(τ1, τ2), τ4←.1 , τ4←.2 }, e2 = {v1(τ1, τ2), τ4←.1 , τ2←.2 }, . . . , and so on.
12. Recall that since the mechanism has been proven to be incentive-compatible we can use the agents’ true valuations
and costs instead of their reported counterparts.
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The set of all hyperedges containing valuations of the very same agent i is defined as:
Evi =
⋃
τ⊆T
Evi (τ )
Then, the set of hyperedges connecting nodes in V to nodes in A is defined as:
Ev =
⋃
i∈I
Evi
Given this, we define the valuation hypergraph as a pair:
Hv = (V ∪ A, Ev)
Thus, each hyperedge in Hv consists of a single valuation vertex corresponding to an element in V
along with a complete task allocation for the valued tasks out of the task-per-bidder nodes in A.
The valuation hypergraphHv partly defines the space within which a solution needs to be found.
However, in order to define the quality of the solution found, it is important to define the weight
attached to each hyperedge of the hypergraph Hv. The weight of a hyperedge is actually equal to
the expected value of the allocation of the tasks to a set of task performers (bidders). Consider,
for instance, valuation v1(τ1, τ2). All the possible matchings that fulfil it are represented by all the
pairs (τ .←11 , τ .←12 ). For example, the hyperedge e2 involving the pairing (τ4←11 , τ2←12 ) denotes that
agent 4 performs task 1 for agent 1 and agent 2 performs task 2 for agent 1. The expected valuation
associated to this allocation depends on the POS of agents 4 and 2 when performing tasks τ1 and τ2
respectively.
In this case, the expected valuation associated to e2 is assessed as:
v1(τ
4←1
1 , τ
2←1
2 ) = v1(τ1, τ2) · p4(τ
4←1
1 ) · p2(τ
2←1
2 )+
v1(τ1) · p4(τ
4←1
1 ) · (1− p2(τ
2←1
2 ))+
v1(τ2) · (1− p4(τ
4←1
1 )) · p2(τ
2←1
2 )
(23)
where p is a function that returns the POS of the agent that is assigned a given task (computed using
confidence, reputation, or trust). Notice that the value (1 − pi(τ i←jk )) represents the probability of
agent i failing to perform task τk for agent j. Since no requests are submitted for τ1 and τ2 alone,
v(τ1) = v(τ2) = 0. Thus, the expected valuation associated to the particular allocation represented
by arc e2 becomes v1(τ4←11 , τ2←12 ) = v1(τ1, τ2) · p4(τ4←11 ) · p2(τ2←12 ). With a similar argument,
we obtain v1(τ4←11 , τ5←12 ) = v1(τ1, τ2) · p4(τ4←11 ) · p5(τ5←12 ) 6= v1(τ4←11 , τ2←12 ), corresponding
to hyperedge e3.
Generalising, given a hyperedge e ∈ Ev with valuation vi(τ ), we can readily build an allocation
for the tasks in τ from the elements in e and vi(τ ). If p is a function that returns the POS (be it
confidence, reputation, or trust) of a given task performer from each requester’s point of view, then
we can compute the expected valuation of the allocation defined by hyperedge e as follows:
vi(τ ) =
∑
τ ′⊆τ
vi(τ ′) ∏
τ
j←.
l
∈e,τl∈τ ′
pj(τ
j←i
l )
∏
τ
j←.
l
∈e,τw∈τ \τ ′
(
1− pj(τ
j←i
w )
) (24)
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In other words, given a hyperedge e ∈ Ev, its weight is assessed using Equation (24) which is
equivalent to the expected value computed in Equation (16) (i.e., the sum of expected values over
all allocations from agent i). Now, given that each edge of the valuation hypergraph is assigned a
weight, Hv is termed a weighted hypergraph.
5.1.3 THE BID HYPERGRAPH
To define the bid hypergraph we need to determine the hyperedges that connect bids to task-per-
bidder nodes. In more detail, given a bid cj(τ ) ∈ C, we relate it to the task-per-bidder nodes in A
by constructing hyperedge Ecj (τ ) = {cj(τ )}∪{τ
j←.
k |τk ∈ τ}. This hyperedge is assigned a weight
which is equal to the cost of cj(τ ). Then the set of all hyperedges containing all the bids of agent i
can be defined as:
Eci =
⋃
τ⊆T
E ic(τ )
Given this, the set of all hyperedges connecting nodes in C to nodes in A can be defined as:
Ec =
⋃
i∈I
Eci
Finally, we define the bid hypergraph as a pair:
Hc = (A ∪ C, Ec)
In other words, each hyperedge in Hc consists of a single bid vertex corresponding to an element in
C along with the corresponding task-per-bidder nodes in A. Notice that our definitions of valuation
and bid hypergraphs ensure that each hyperedge in Hv contains a single valuation from V and each
hyperedge in Hc contains a single bid from C.
5.1.4 DEFINING THE MATCHING PROBLEM FOR THE GTBM
Having defined the valuation and bid hypergraphs, we can now structurally characterise the notions
of feasible and optimal allocations (these are needed to determine the computational complexity of
the problem and define the objective function in particular). For this purpose, we must firstly recall
some notions of hypergraph theory. In a hypergraph, two hyperedges are said to be adjacent if their
intersection is not empty. Otherwise they are said to be disjoint. For a hypergraph H = (X, E), a
family E ′ ⊆ E is defined to be a matching if the hyperedges of E ′ are pairwise disjoint. With respect
to a given matching E ′, a vertex xi is said to be matched or covered if there is a hyperedge in E ′
incident to xi. If a vertex is not matched, it is said to be unmatched or exposed. A matching that
leaves no vertices exposed is said to be complete.
Based on the definitions above, we can characterise feasible allocations in the GTBM as follows.
First, we must find a matching for the valuation hypergraph that is not necessarily complete (some
valuations may remain exposed). Second, we must find another matching for the bid hypergraph
that is not necessarily complete either. The two matchings must be related in the following manner:
the task-per-bidder nodes in both matchings should be the same. In other words, given a task-per-
bidder node, it must be related to some valuation node and to some bid node, or else be excluded
from both matchings. In this way, valuations and bids are linked to create single-task allocations.
For instance, in Figure 1, if e2 belongs to the matching for the valuation hypergraph, then e′4 must
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be part of the matching for the bid hypergraph to ensure that there is a bid for τ2←.2 and that either
e′1, e
′
2, or e
′
3 are part of the matching for the bid hypergraph to ensure that there is a bid for τ4←.1 .
More formally:
Definition 10. Feasible allocation. We say that a pair (Ev′ , Ec′) defines a feasible allocation iff:
• Ev
′ is a matching for Hv.
• Ec
′ is a matching for Hc.
• ∀τ ∈ A: (τ is matched by Ev′) ⇐⇒ (τ is matched by Ec′).
Given a feasible allocation (Ev′ , Ec′) as defined above, it is straightforward to assess the ex-
pected utility of all agents within the system as follows:∑
e∈Ev
′
w(e)−
∑
e′∈Ec
′
w(e′)
since the weights of the hyperedges in the valuation hypergraph stand for expected valuations and
the weights of the hyperedges in the bid hypergraph stand for costs. Solving Equation (16) in the
GTBM amounts to finding the feasible allocation that maximises the expected utility of all agents
within the system. Therefore, the following definition naturally follows.
Definition 11. GTBM Task Allocation Problem The problem of assessing the task allocation that
maximises the expected utility of all agents within the system amounts to solving:
arg max
(Ev
′
,Ec
′
)
∑
e∈Ev
′
wv(e)−
∑
e′∈Ec
′
wc(e
′) (25)
where (Ev′ , Ec′) stands for a feasible allocation.
Having defined the matching problem for the GTBM, we next describe our solution to this
problem using Integer Programming techniques that are commonly used to solve such problems
(Cerquides, Endriss, Giovannucci, & Rodrı´guez-Aguilar, 2007).13
5.2 An Integer Programming Solution
In this section we show how to map the problem posed by Equation (25) into an integer program
(Papadimitriou & Steiglitz, 1982) so that it can be efficiently implemented and solved. Given this
translation, the resulting program can be solved by powerful commercial solvers such as ILOG
CPLEX14 or LINGO.15
13. Other special purpose algorithms (e.g., using dynamic programming or search trees) could also be designed to solve
this combinatorial problem. However, to understand the magnitude of the problem and to compare the difficulty of
solving this problem against other similar problems, we believe it is better to first attempt to find the solution using
standard techniques such as IP.
14. http://www.ilog.com
15. http://www.lindo.com
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5.2.1 OBJECTIVE FUNCTION AND SIDE CONSTRAINTS
The translation of Equation (25) into an IP is reasonably straightforward given our representation.
Thus, solving the GTBM task allocation problem amounts to maximising the following objective
function: ∑
e∈Ev
xe · wv(e)−
∑
e′∈Ec
ye′ · wc(e
′) (26)
where xe ∈ {0, 1} is a binary decision variable representing whether the valuation in hyperedge
e is selected or not, and ye′ ∈ {0, 1} is a binary decision variable representing whether the bid in
hyperedge e′ is selected or not. Thus, xe is a decision variable that selects a given valuation with a
given task-bidder matching, and ye′ selects a given bid.
However, some side constraints must be fulfilled in order to obtain a valid solution. First, the
semantics of the bidding language must be satisfied. Second, if a hyperedge containing a set of task-
per-bidder nodes inA is selected, we must ensure that the bids covering such nodes are selected too.
Moreover, as we employ the XOR bidding language, the auctioneer — the centre in our case — can
only select at most one bid per bidder and at most one valuation per asker. Thus, as for bidders, this
constraint translates into: ∑
e′∈Eci
ye′ ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ I (27)
For instance, in Figure 1 this constraint ensures the auctioneer selects one hyperedge out of e′1, e′2,
and e′3, since they all belong to agent 4 (they all come from nodes labelled with the same subscript
c4(.)).
For the valuations, the XOR constraints involving them are collected in the following expres-
sion: ∑
e∈Evi
xe ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ I (28)
For instance, in Figure 1 this constraint forces the auctioneer to select one hyperedge out of e1, e2,
e3, e4, and e5 since they all belong to agent 1 (they all come from nodes labelled with the same
subscript v1(.)).
If a valuation hyperedge e ∈ Ev is selected, the set of task-per-bidder nodes in A connected
to e must be performed by the corresponding bidder agent. For instance, in Figure 1, if hyperedge
e5 is selected, the task-per-bidder nodes τ4←11 and τ4←13 must be covered by some bid of agent 4.
In this case, bid c4(τ1, τ3) is the one covering those tasks. Thus, if we select hyperedge e5 we are
forced to select bid c4(τ1, τ3) by selecting hyperedge e′3. Thus, in terms of hyperedges, we must
ensure that the number of valuation hyperarcs containing a given task-per-bidder node is less than
or equal to the number of bid hyperarcs containing it. Graphically, this means that the number of
incident valuation hyperedges in a given node a ∈ A must be less than the number of incident bid
hyperedges in a. ∑
e∈Ev ,τ j←.
k
∈e
xe ≤
∑
e′∈Ec,τ j←.
k
∈e′
ye′ ∀τ
j←.
k ∈ A (29)
In case of no free-disposal (i.e., if we do not allow agents to execute tasks without them being asked
for) we simply have to replace≤with =. To summarise, solving the GTBM task allocation problem
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amounts to maximising the objective function defined by expression (26) subject to the constraints
in expressions (27), (28), and (29). Next, we determine the complexity results for this problem.
5.2.2 COMPLEXITY RESULTS
Having represented the GTBM task allocation problem and defined the corresponding IP formula-
tion, we analyse its computational complexity in order to show the difficulty in solving the GTBM.
We also identify the main parameters that affect the computational costs of finding the optimal al-
location. These parameters should then allow us to determine in which settings the GTBM can be
practically used.
Proposition 7. The GTBM task allocation problem is NP-complete and cannot be approximated
to a ratio n1−ǫ in polynomial time unless P = ZPP , where n is the total number of bids and
valuations.
Proof. Notice that our optimisation model, as formalised by Equation (26), naturally translates to a
combinatorial exchange (Kalagnanam, Davenport, & Lee, 2000). This translation can be achieved
using our representation by taking the goods (in a combinatorial exchange) to be the dummy tasks
τ ∈ T , the bids the elements in C, and the asks the weights of the hyperedges in Hv. Thus, while
bids remain the same in the exchange, the number of valuations may significantly increase. The
reason being that the introduction of trust in our theoretical model makes the initial valuations (asks),
the elements in V , allocation-dependent. Hence, every single valuation in V causes several asks to
be originated for the exchange when considering the bidder to which each task may be allocated
(see examples in Section 5.1.2). As shown by Sandholm et al. (2002), the decision problem for a
binary single-unit combinatorial exchange winner determination problem is NP-complete and the
optimisation problem cannot be approximated to a ratio n1−ǫ in polynomial time unless P = ZPP ,
where n is the number of bids. Therefore, the optimisation problem is NP-hard, and so it is in
GTBM.
From the above proof, it can be understood that the search space in the GTBM task allocation
problem is significantly larger than in traditional combinatorial exchanges because of the depen-
dency of valuations on the bidders performing tasks. In what follows, we provide a formula that
allows us to calculate exactly how big this search space is. This allows us to determine whether
the instance to be solved can actually be handled by the solver (which will have its own limits on
memory requirements and computation time).
In more detail, say that Ak is the subset of A containing the task-per-bidder nodes referring
to the same tasks. More formally, Ak = {τ j←.k ∈ A | j ∈ I}. From the example in Figure 1,
A2 = {τ
4←.
2 , τ
2←.
2 , τ
5←.
2 }. Thus, the expression to assess the number of feasible allocations is:
|Ev| =
∑
i∈I
∑
vi(τ ) 6=0
∏
τk∈τ
|Ak| (30)
Observe that the number of possible allocations can be computed as the cardinality of Ev (i.e., the
number of valuation hyperarcs) since it exactly determines the number of ways the valuations can
be satisfied by the provided bids. The total number of decision variables of the Integer Program is
thus |Ev|+ |Ec|. Since the number of expected valuations is several times larger than the number of
bids, we expect the number of decision variables associated to bid hyperedges to be much less than
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the number of valuation hyperedges. Hence, assuming that |Ec| ≪ |Ev|, the number of decision
variables will be of the order of |Ev|.
In order to understand the implications of these parameters, consider the case in which all task
performers bid over all tasks and all requesters submit a single valuation over all tasks. Specifically,
consider a scenario with 15 task performers, 20 requesters, and 5 tasks. Given that in this case
|Ak = 5|, the number of allocations is |Ev| = 20× 155 = 15187500. In reality, agents may not be
able to submit bids and asks over all tasks and this would result in a significantly lower number of
allocations (given the possible matchings). Hence, to see whether such instances can be practically
solved, in Appendix A, we report the running times of the solver, showing that instances with less
than 2×105 variables can be comfortably solved within 40 seconds (in the worst case). When taken
together, our empirical results and our formula to compute the size of the input (i.e., Equation 30)
allow us to affirm that, even if the computational cost associated to the GTBM has the potential to
be rather high, our solution can handle small and medium sized problems in reasonable time (see
table 3). However, as can be seen, the time to complete grows exponentially with the number of
Set Tasks Task Requesters Task Performers Worst Case Running Time
1 5 20 15 34 s
2 8 20 15 40 mins
3 10 20 15 3 days
Table 3: Average running times for different numbers of tasks and agents (taken over 300 sample runs for set
1, 50 sample runs for sets 2 and 3).
tasks. During our experimental analysis, we also found that the impact of increasing the number of
task performers and task requesters was not as significant as increasing the number of tasks. This
can be explained by the fact that, given our setup, a larger number of tasks allows significantly more
matchings between bids and asks than a larger number of bids and asks. Hence, many more task
requesters and performers can be accommodated for small numbers of tasks. It should also be noted
that we expect these worst case results to occur fairly rarely on average (much less than half of the
instances generated from the same parameters), as shown in Figure 2 in Appendix A.
Having described the complete picture of the GTBM and its implementation, we next discuss
some important issues that may arise when trying to use a GTBM for task allocation.
6. Discussion
In this paper we have developed task allocation mechanisms that operate effectively when agents
cannot reliably complete tasks assigned to them. Specifically, we have designed a novel Generalised
Trust-Based Mechanism that is efficient and individually rational. This mechanism deals with the
case where task requesters form their opinions about task performers using reports from their envi-
ronment and their own direct interactions with the performers. In addition to studying the economic
properties of the allocation mechanisms, we provided the optimisation model that generates the so-
lutions that guarantee the efficiency of our mechanism. This optimisation model is the first solver
for trust-based mechanisms (and other mechanisms in which the value of an allocation depends on
the performer of the allocation) and is based on Integer Programming. As a result, we have shown
that the input explodes combinatorially due to the huge number of possible allocations that must
be enumerated. Nevertheless, while the computational cost associated to the GTBM is shown to be
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rather high, given our implementation, we are still able to manage small to medium-sized problems
in reasonable time.
Speaking more generally, our work on trust-based mechanisms has a number of broader im-
plications. First, the GTBM shows how to explicitly blend work on trust models with work on
mechanism design. Since the mechanism guarantees that certain properties hold for task allocation
problems, it can be used as a new, well-founded testbed within which trust models can be eval-
uated. Up to now, trust models have mainly been tested with randomly generated scenarios and
interactions that obey somewhat ad hoc market rules such as those used in the ART testbed (Fullam,
Klos, Muller, Sabater, Topol, Barber, Rosenschein, & Vercouter, 2005). Second, our work is the
first single-stage interdependent valuations mechanism that is efficient and individually rational (as
opposed to Mezzetti’s two-stage mechanism). This has been made achievable in the settings we
consider by capturing the interdependence between types through the trust function and making the
payments to the agents contingent on the actual execution of tasks. Another novelty of our approach
is that we are able to extract the (maximum) marginal contribution of an agent despite the valua-
tions being interdependent (as we have shown in Section 4.4). Third, our implementation of GTBM
highlights the importance of considering the computational aspects of any new mechanism, since
these determine whether the mechanism is implementable for realistic scenarios and can indeed
bring about its claimed benefits. Our work is a strong statement in this direction since we provide
the complete picture of the problem, starting from its representation, through its implementation
and sample results, to its complexity analysis.
In practical terms, the GTBM is a step towards building robust multi-agent systems for uncertain
environments. In such environments, it is important to aggregate the agents’ preferences, while
taking into account the uncertainty in order to ensure that the solutions chosen result in the best
possible outcome for the whole system. Prior to the GTBM, it was not possible to come up with
an efficient solution that would maximise this expected utility. Moreover, the fact that agents can
express their perception of the task performers’ POS is a new way of building more expressive
interactions between buyers and sellers of services (Sandholm, 2007). We believe that the more
such perceptions are expressed, the better is the ensuing matching between buyers and sellers and
our results are proof of the gain in efficiency this better matching brings about (see sections 3.2.1,
3.3.1, and 4.3).
By introducing GTBM as a new class of mechanisms, this work lays the foundations for several
areas of inquiry. To this end, we outline some of the main areas below.
• Budget Balance: An important economic property of mechanisms in some contexts is budget
balance.16 However, as mentioned in Section 3.3.2, we have designed our TBMs without
considering budget balance. In fact, the GTBM is not budget balanced similar to the VCG and
Porter et al.’s mechanism. Now, one possible way of overcoming this problem is to sacrifice
either efficiency or individual rationality. In fact, the dAGVA mechanism is a counterpart of
the VCG which does indeed sacrifice individual rationality for budget balance (see Section
2). Moreover, Parkes, Kalagnanam, and Eso (2001) develop mechanisms where a number
of budget balancing schemes are proposed and near-incentive compatibility is attained by
making the payments by the agents as close as possible to those of the VCG ones. Their
16. If a mechanism is budget balanced, it computes transfers in each allocation such that the overall transfer in the system
is zero (MasColell et al., 1995). Thus, in a budget balanced mechanism, for each allocation K and associated transfer
vector r, we have
∑
ri∈ r
ri = 0.
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most effective scheme, the Threshold rule, results in a low loss of incentive-compatibility
and it has a relatively high efficiency (around 80%). Such budget balance may be useful in
situations where the centre cannot run the risk of incurring a loss in generating the efficient
outcome for the set of agents in the system. For example, MoviePictures.com may not find
it worth injecting money into the system to find the efficient outcome if all its subunits are
all nearly equally competitive (both in price and POS). Instead MoviePictures.com might
prefer a mechanism that generates a near-efficient outcome by increasing Bi as discussed in
Section 4.4. By doing this, the set of agents that participate might be reduced because it is
not individually rational for all of them to participate in the mechanism, but, nevertheless,
MoviePictures.com may obtain a better outcome. In the future, we will study such trade-offs
between the efficiency achieved in the system against the profit made by the centre.
• Trust in Task Requesters: One other potential criticism of mechanisms such as ours is that
the task requesters (and the centre) must be trusted to reveal the observed execution of the task
(Mezzetti, 2004). However, in our setting, task requesters have a strong incentive to reveal
their observations (in case these are not publicly visible) since they would prefer their chosen
task performer to be available the next time the mechanism is run. To this end, they must
ensure that the task performer does not go bankrupt. As noted in Equations (12) and (17), the
task performer would have to pay a significant amount to the centre in case it is reported to
fail at its task. Hence, the task requester is better off revealing a successful execution if the
task performer is indeed successful.
Another issue with the trust function used is that weights given to each agent’s EQOS report
may be uncertain. Thus, in this case, agents may have to learn these weights over multiple
interactions. Given this, it is important to develop learning and search techniques that will
be able to deal with the large number of possible weights that could be used in these trust
functions. These techniques will have to take into account the fact that agents may lose out
significantly while exploring the search space.
• Iterative Mechanisms: The GTBM is a one-shot mechanism in which the allocation and
the payments are calculated given the type of the agents {v, c,η} using their trust models.
However, in some cases the participants may be engaged in repeated interactions that can be
exploited by their trust models in order to build accurate trust values of their counterparts.
In such situations, the introduction of multiple rounds can compromise the properties of the
mechanism by allowing for a greater range of strategies (e.g., cornering the market by consis-
tently offering low prices in initial rounds or accepting losses in initial rounds by providing
false and damaging information about competitors). However, the explosion in the strategy
space also implies that agents might not be able to compute their optimal strategy due to the
intractability of such a process. Now, one way of solving this problem is to constrain the
strategies of the agents to be myopic (i.e., best response to the current round) as shown by
Parkes and Ungar (2000) using proxy bidding. Another is to allow the agents to learn the trust
models without participating in the allocation problem. Then, once the agents have an accu-
rate representation of the trust functions and POS values, the mechanism can be implemented
as a one-shot encounter. Note that this problem arises in any one-shot mechanism which is
implemented in an iterative context and is not solely in the realm of the GTBM.
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• Computational Cost: As discussed in Section 5, the algorithms we developed to compute
the efficient allocation have to be run multiple times to compute the individual payments to
the agents for TBMs. Hence, the time needed to compute the allocation and pay the agents
may be impractical if the agents have a very limited time to find a solution, put forward a large
number of bids, or ask for a large number of tasks to be performed. Hence, it is important
that either less complex mechanisms such as those described by Nisan and Ronen (2007)
or approximate (and computationally less expensive) algorithms be developed to solve such
problems (Archer, Papadimitriou, Talwar, & Tardos, 2003). This will require more work in
developing local approximation algorithms and the approximate mechanisms that preserve
some of the properties we seek. In this vein, this paper provides a point of departure for these
future mechanisms since it provides the efficient mechanisms against which the approximate
ones can be compared.
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Appendix A. Analysing the Performance of the IP Solution
In this section we analyse the computational performance of the Integer Programming solution we
detailed in Section 5 in order to gauge the sizes of problems that can be solved in reasonable time. To
this end, it is important to recall that (as was shown in Section 5) the number of input variables to the
optimization problem is nearly equal to the number of valuation hyperedges |Ev|, since |Ec| ≪ |Ev|.
Given this, we can assume that the performance of the solver is directly related to the number of
possible allocations approximated as |Ev|.
Therefore, our test set is composed of several instances of the GTBM Task Allocation Problem
characterised by the number of possible allocations. In more detail, to produce such allocations, bids
and valuations are generated so that the number of bids submitted by a single bidder and the number
of valuations submitted by a single requester follow a geometric distribution with the p parameter
set to 0.23 (Milton & Arnold, 1998) (in order to randomly generate relatively large numbers of
bids/asks per agent).17 A medium-sized problem is set as follows. The number of negotiated tasks
is set to 5. The number of task performers is set to 15 and the number of task requesters is set to 20.
17. Setting p higher would result in fewer bids/asks per agent.
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The average number of generated valuations for each instance is 88 and the average number of bids
is 65. Finally, the number of runs of the experiments is 300. Our experiments were performed on a
Xeon dual processor machine with 3Ghz CPUs, 2 GB RAM and the commercial software employed
to solve the Integer Program is ILOG CPLEX 9.1.
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Figure 2: Performance of the IP solution.
The results are shown in Figure 2. Specifically, the x-axis represents the number of allocations
of a given problem instance and the y-axis represents the time in seconds elapsed in solving the
corresponding problem instance. Notice that the dependence of the difficulty of the problem on the
number of allocations is quite clear. Moreover, as can be seen, it is possible to solve a problem with
less than 2 × 105 variables within 40 seconds. It is important to note that the performance of the
solver used is critical in this case and future advancements to Mixed Integer Programming (MIP)
solvers and CPU clock speeds can only improve our results.
Given these results and since we provide a general formula (see Equation (30)) to compute
a priori the number of generated allocations, it is possible to estimate the feasibility of a general
problem before performing it. This means that the system designer can ask task requesters and
performers to constrain the number of tasks they ask for or the number of bids they issue to come
up with an input that can be solved by the program in a reasonable time. It will be more important,
however, to design special purpose algorithms that can deal with larger inputs and this is left as
future work.
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